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This document is a Final (Tier I) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
addressing the potential environmental consequences associated with 
continuing the modifications o f  the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft for . 
launch using a booster/upper stage combination that is different from the 
one planned for use prior to the Challenger accident, while conducting the 
detailed safety and environmental analysis in order to preserve the October 
1989 1 aunch opportunity for Gal ileo and an October 1990 1 aunch opportunity 
for Ulysses. 
While detailed safety and environmental analyses associated with the 
missions are underway, they currently are not complete. Nevertheless, 
sufficient information is available to enable a choice among the 
reconfiguration alternatives presented. Relevant assessments o f  the 
potential for environmental impacts are presented. 
i 
SUMMARY 
The G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions are p a r t  o f  t he  Nat ional  Aeronautics 
The and Space Admin is t ra t ion 's  (NASA's) Solar System Explorat ion Program. 
G a l i l e o  mission i s  designed t o  study Jup i te r ,  i t s  f o u r  major moons, and i t s  
extended electromagnetic environment. The Ulysses mission i s  a j o i n t  
program o f  the European Space Agency (ESA) and NASA and i s  designed t o  study 
the  p o l a r  regions o f  t he  Sun. 
PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE ACTION 
The proposed a c t i o n  addressed by t h i s  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) Environmental 
Impact Statement ( E I S )  i s  t o  continue w i t h  mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  t h e  G a l i l e o  and 
Ulysses missions as c u r r e n t l y  planned. 
prov ide updated i n fo rma t ion  necessary t o  support decisionmaking associated 
w i t h  con t inu ing  t o  make mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the  Gal i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  
t o  preserve t h e  launch oppor tun i ty  on the  Space Transpor tat ion System (STS) 
S h u t t l e  i n  October 1989 and October 1990, respec t i ve l y .  
planned t o  use t h e  S h u t t l e  and t h e  newly designed Centaur G-Prime upper 
stage rocke t  f o r  launching both missions i n  May 1986. A D r a f t  E I S  f o r  t h i s  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  p rev ious l y  was publ ished i n  September 1985. Fol lowing the  
Challenger accident, NASA cancelled the development o f  the Shuttle version 
o f  Centaur (i.e., t h e  Centaur G-Prime) due t o  sa fe ty  concerns unre lated t o  
the  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraft.  
and s e l e c t  a new booster/upper stage combination f o r  both t h e  G a l i l e o  and 
Ulysses missions, and t o  prepare t h i s  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) E I S .  
documentation w i l l  address the  proposed a c t i o n  o f  t he  completion o f  t he  
development and operat ion o f  the missions, i n c l u d i n g  t h e i r  launch us ing the  
Shutt le/IUS launch veh ic le  conf igurat ion.  The add i t i ona l  NEPA documentation 
w i l l  u t i l i z e  t h e  most p e r t i n e n t  data and analyses d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  the  
missions which w i l l  r e s u l t  from extensive sa fe ty  t e s t  and analys is  programs 
c u r r e n t l y  being conducted by NASA and the  U.S. Department o f  Energy (DOE). 
This E I S  has been prepared t o  
NASA p rev ious l y  had 
This  a c t i o n  has requ i red  NASA t o  de f i ne  
Add i t i ona l  Nat ional  Environmental Pol i c y  Act (NEPA) r e l a t e d  
The mod i f i ca t i ons  of t h e  spacecraf t  addressed i n  t h i s  E I S  are necessary 
t o  a l l ow  the  missions t o  accomplish t h e i r  s c i e n t i f i c  ob jec t i ves  a t  minimum 
cost  o f  scarce human and f i s c a l  resources. 
cont inue modify ing the e x i s t i n g  spacecraft;  performing the  work requ i red  t o  
i n t e g r a t e  t h e  spacecraf t  w i t h  the  new launch vehic le;  and conducting 
support ing design, t e s t ,  and development e f f o r t s ,  wh i l e  completing the F ina l  
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the  add i t i ona l  NEPA r e l a t e d  documentation 
addressing launch impl icat ions.  This ac t i on  i s  necessary t o  preserve the 
op t i on  o f  launch o f  t he  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraft i n  October 1989 and 
October 1990, respec t i ve l y .  Any delay i n  the launch w i l l  increase costs, 
delay s c i e n t i f i c  re turns,  threaten f u r t h e r  l oss  o f  key personnel, and 
, threaten the performance o f  spacecraft systems due t o  s h e l f - l i f e  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  
The proposed a c t i o n  i s  t o  
. A t  NASA's request, the DOE i s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  the preparat ion o f  t h i s  
EIS because o f  i t s  r o l e  i n  p rov id ing  Radioisotope Thermoelectr ic Generators 
ii 
(RTGs) and Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUS) for NASA missions and because of 
its responsibility for RTG and RHU applications. 
and Ulysses, which involve radiological material, must satisfy an extensive 
interagency 1 aunch safety approval process which involves the Interagency 
Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) and the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP). The OSTP bases its decision on the Agency’s request, the 
supporting positions by the DOE and DOD, and the INSRP SER. The approval 
process is set forth in NSC-PD 25 (December 14, 1978) which documents the 
steps followed by the agencies (DOE, NASA, DOD) since the early 1960’s. 
agency proposing to launch a mission is required to conduct an extensive 
safety analysis prior to requesting launch approval from the OSTP. In the 
present case, DOE conducts the safety verification test and analysis 
activity for NASA because DOE retains ownership of, and responsibility for, 
the nuclear systems even though they are integrated onto the NASA 
spacecraft. DOE provides NASA and the INSRP with a FSAR. The INSRP 
coordinates the independent safety evaluations by the safety and 
environmental elements of the agencies and provides a Safety Evaluation 
Report (SER) to the agencies and the OSTP. 
coordinators appointed by NASA, DOE, and 000; INSRP is supported by several 
expert subpanels. Based on the FSAR, the SER, and consultation with other 
agencies, the 1 aunchi ng agency (i .e. NASA) requests 1 aunch approval from 
the OSTP. 
In addition to the requirements of the NEPA, missions such as Galileo 
The 
The INSRP consists of 
The actual NASA decision to request OSTP launch approval for Galileo 
will be made in the summer of 1989 and for Ulysses in 1990. The proposed 
action of this Final (Tier 1) EIS neither precludes nor obviates the 
opportunity to delay or to cancel the missions at those times. 
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 
The proposed action addressed by this EIS is to continue to make 
modifications to the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft to use the STS with an 
IUS in place of the Centaur G-Prime upper stage and adopting the Venus- 
Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) trajectory for Gal ileo. This will allow 
the launch opportunity for the Galileo spacecraft in October 1989 to be 
preserved whi 1 e conducting detai 1 ed safety and environmental analyses, and 
also will allow the necessary up-front IUS integration activities for the 
Ulysses launch planned in 1990 to be performed in a timely, programmati- 
cally sound manner. The alternatives to the proposed action discussed in 
this EIS are: 
0 Delay the program, including stopping modifications to the spacecraft, 
until the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the additional NEPA 
documentation for Galileo and Ulysses are complete, precluding a launch 
of Galileo in 1989 but still allowing a Ulysses launch in 1990 (or 1991 
for both spacecraft), and using the same or the Titan IV launch vehicle 
configuration. 
0 Continue with either the Galileo or Ulysses mission and cancel the 
other mission. 
0 .  Adopt the no-action alternative, resulting in termination of the 
further commitment of resources to both missions. 
i i i  
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
No immediate o r  near-term adverse environmental consequences are 
associated w i t h  the  proposed ac t i on  t o  cont inue spacecraf t  mod i f i ca t ions .  
The delay a l t e r n a t i v e  a lso  has no environmental consequences. I n  add i t ion ,  
p re l im ina ry  review o f  t he  environmental r i s k s  associated w i t h  completion and 
operat ion o f  t h e  missions does no t  es tab l i sh  a bas is  e i t h e r  f o r  abandoning 
o r  de lay ing the  program. On the  o ther  hand, adoption o f  t he  proposed ac t i on  
avoids an increase i n  costs, preserves the  schedule f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  re tu rns ,  
prevents t h e  t h r e a t  o f  f u r t h e r  loss o f  key personnel, and lessens the  t h r e a t  
t o  performance o f  spacecraf t  systems due t o  she l f -1  i f e  de te r io ra t i on .  
i v  
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1. PURPOSE AND NEED FOR ACTION 
Y 
The G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions are p a r t  o f  the Nat ional  Aeronautics 
and Space Admin is t ra t ion 's  (NASA's) Solar System Explorat ion Program. The 
G a l i l e o  mission i s  designed t o  study Jup i te r ,  i t s  f o u r  major moons, and i t s  
extended electromagnetic environment. The Ulysses mission i s  a j o i n t  pro- 
gram of t he  European Space Agency (ESA) and NASA and i s  designed t o  study 
t h e  p o l a r  regions o f  t he  Sun. 
This  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) Environmental Impact Statement ( E I S )  has been 
prepared t o  prov ide updated in format ion necessary t o  support decisionmaking 
associated w i t h  prepar ing the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  f o r  a poss ib le  
launch on the Space Transportat ion System (STS) S h u t t l e  i n  October 1989 and 
October 1990, respec t i ve l y .  
cont inue t o  make mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  t o  use 
the  STS w i th  t h e  I n e r t i a l  Upper Stage (IUS) i n  place o f  t he  Centaur G-Prime 
upper stage and adopting the  Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) 
t r a j e c t o r y  f o r  Gal i leo.  
G a l i l e o  spacecraft i n  October 1989 t o  be preserved wh i l e  conducting a 
d e t a i l e d  sa fe ty  and environmental analysis,  and a lso w i l l  a l l ow  the  
necessary up-front IUS i n t e g r a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  the Ulysses launch planned 
i n  1990 t o  be performed i n  a t imely,  programmatical ly sound manner. 
Add i t i ona l  Nat ional  Environmental Pol i c y  Act (NEPA) r e l a t e d  documentation 
i nco rpo ra t i ng  safety data c u r r e n t l y  being produced and analyzed w i l l  be 
prepared p r i o r  t o  the dec is ion t o  complete the development and operate the 
m i  s s i  ons. 
The proposed ac t i on  addressed by t h i s  E I S  i s  t o  
This w i l l  a l l ow  the launch oppor tun i ty  f o r  t h e  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
I n  September 1985, NASA published a D r a f t  E I S  (Ref. 1) f o r  the G a l i l e o  
and Ulysses missions. The proposed ac t i on  presented i n  the  D r a f t  E I S  was t o  
use the S h u t t l e  and the newly designed Centaur G-Prime upper stage rocket  
f o r  launching both missions i n  May 1986. Fol lowing the Challenger (STS-51L) 
accident, NASA cancel led the  development o f  the S h u t t l e  vers ion o f  Centaur 
(i.e., the Centaur G - P r i m e )  due t o  s a f e t y  concerns unre lated t o  the  G a l i l e o  
and Ulysses s acecraft.  This a c t i o n  has requi red NASA t o - d e f i n e  and se lec t  
missions, and t o  prepare t h i s  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) E I S .  
a new booster P /upper stage combination f o r  both the  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses 
A t  NASA's request, the Department of Energy (DOE) i s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  
the  preparat ion of t h i s  E I S  because of i t s  r o l e  i n  p rov id ing  Radioisotope 
Thermoelectr ic Generators (RTGs) and Radioisotope Heater Un i t s  (RHUS) f o r  
NASA missions and because o f  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  RTG and RHU appl ica-  
t i o n s .  
l F o r  the  purpose o f  t h i s  document, the t e r m  "booster" w i l l  apply t o  the 
p o r t i o n  o f  the launch con f igu ra t i on  requi red t o  reach Earth o r b i t .  I n  the 
case o f  t he  STS/IUS launch veh ic le  con f igu ra t i on  the S h u t t l e  serves as the 
booster and d e l i v e r s  the I U S  and spacecraft i n t o  o r b i t .  The I U S  upper 
stages then supply energy t o  place the spacecraft on an i n t e r p l a n e t a r y  
t r a j e c t o r y  (e.g., t o  Venus o r  t o  J u p i t e r ) .  
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I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  the  requirements o f  t he  NEPA, missions such as G a l i l e o  
and Ulysses, which i nvo l ve  r a d i o l o g i c a l  ma te r ia l ,  must s a t i s f y  an extensive 
interagency launch sa fe ty  approval process which involves the Interagency 
Nuclear Safety Review Panel ( INSRP) and the O f f i c e  o f  Science and Technology 
P o l i c y  (OSTP). The approval process i s  set  f o r t h  i n  NSC-PD 25 (December 14, 
1978) which documents the steps fol lowed by the agencies (DOE, NASA, DOD) 
s ince the e a r l y  1960’s. The agency proposing t o  launch a mission i s  
requ i red  t o  conduct an extensive sa fe ty  analys is  p r i o r  t o  request ing launch 
approval from the  OSTP. I n  the  present case, DOE conducts t h e  sa fe ty  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  and analys is  a c t i v i t y  f o r  NASA because DOE r e t a i n s  
ownership o f ,  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r ,  the nuclear power systems even though 
they are i n teg ra ted  onto the  NASA spacecraft.  
INSRP w i t h  a F ina l  Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). 
independent sa fe ty  evaluat ion by the safety  and environmental elements of 
t he  agencies and provides a Safety Evaluat ion Report (SER) t o  the  agencies 
and the  OSTP. The INSRP consis ts  o f  coordinators appointed by NASA, DOE, 
and DOD; INSRP i s  supported by several expert  subpanels. Based on the  FSAR, 
t he  SER, and consu l ta t i on  w i t h  other  agencies, t he  launching agency (i.e., 
NASA) requests launch approval from the  OSTP. 
DOE provides NASA and the  
The INSRP coordinates the 
The actual  NASA dec is ion t o  request OSTP launch approval f o r  G a l i l e o  
The proposed w i l l  be made i n  the  summer o f  1989 and f o r  Ulysses i n  1990. 
a c t i o n  o f  t h i s  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) EIS n e i t h e r  precludes nor obviates the  
oppor tun i t y  t o  delay o r  t o  cancel t he  missions a t  those times. 
The G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions support NASA’s Solar System 
Explorat ion Program and i t s  cont inu ing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  engage i n  the 
s c i e n t i f i c  exp lo ra t i on  o f  t he  s o l a r  system using Earth-based observations, 
spacecraft,  l abo ra to ry  studies, and t h e o r e t i c a l  research. 
program are t o  f u r t h e r  our understanding’ o f :  
- 
The goals o f  t h i s  
0 The o r i g i n  and evo lu t i on  o f  t he  Solar System 
0 The o r i g i n  and evo lu t i on  o f  l i f e  
0 The Earth by comparative s tud ies o f  the o the r  planets.  
The G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions are expected t o  make important con t r i bu -  
t i o n s  toward these goals. 
1.1.1 G a l i l e o  Miss ion 
The s c i e n t i f i c  ob jec t i ves  o f  t he  G a l i l e o  mission are t o  conduct 
comprehensive i nves t i ga t i ons  o f  t he  Jovian p lanetary  system by making 
measurements o f  t he  p l  anet , i t s  environment, and i t s  sate1 1 i tes.  
the l a r g e s t  and most massive p lanet  i n  the s o l a r  system, and i s  unique i n  
t h a t  i t  emits more energy than i t  receives. Together w i t h  i t s  moons, the 
p lanet  almost comprises a min i  s o l a r  system. 
and i t s  p r i n c i p a l  s a t e l l i t e s  w i l l  g r e a t l y  extend the knowledge o f  the r o l e  
o f  the Jovian system i n  the complex and analogous r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e x i s t i n g  
between the Sun and i t s  p lanetary  system. 
J u p i t e r  i s  
Close-up s tud ies o f  the p lanet  
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The Galileo objectives will be accomplished through two separate 
mi ss i on el ements : 
0 An orbiter will tour and study the planet and the Jovian 
satellites .over a 20-month period 
0 A detachable atmospheric entry probe will descend through the 
atmosphere of Jupiter and during a period of roughly 1 hour 
relay scientific measurements of the atmospheric profile to Earth 
via the orbiter. 
The Galileo mission will be a study of the entire Jovian system, with 
scientific objectives that fall into three broad categories: (1) the 
structure and composition of Jupiter‘s atmosphere; (2) the composition and 
physical state of the Galilean satellites; and (3) the structure, 
composition, and dynamics of the Jovian magnetosphere. 
Previous missions to Jupiter have made only remote measurements of the 
Jovian atmosphere. It is believed that Jupiter is composed of the original 
material from which stars, and most specifically our Sun, are formed. The 
atmospheric entry probe should provide data, during a 1-hour atmospheric 
descent period, on the Jovian atmospheric composition to a depth of 10 to 20 
times the sea-level pressure on Earth. It is anticipated that this will 
include all the major cloud layers of the Jovian atmosphere. This will 
greatly enhance the present understanding of the Jovian atmosphere, and of 
planetary atmospheres in general. It may be possible to acquire knowledge 
of the conditions in the solar system at the time of planetary formation. 
The abundance of helium and rare gases in the Jovian atmosphere are 
important indicators of conditions in the early solar system and of how the 
giant planets kept their atmospheres. It is possible that the outer Jovian 
atmosphere is representative of the unmodified material that subsequently 
formed the Sun, the planets, and other solar system objects. Other informa- 
tion that will be obtained from the atmospheric entry probe includes the 
location and characterization of the Jovian clouds, an analysis of how solar 
energy is absorbed and the quantity o f  energy that is flowing out of 
Jupiter’s still-cooling interior, a determination o f  lightning frequency, 
and a determination o f  whether or not small quantities o f  organic molecules 
are being created from methane and ammonia. 
The 20-month period during which the orbiter will be obtaining 
information while in orbit around Jupiter will provide new information on 
the deep interior of Jupiter through measurements of the Jovian 
gravitational field. 
The Jovian satellites will be investigated at ranges from 20 to 100 
This increased resolution will 
It should be possible to 
times closer than earlier missions, typically at ranges of 1,000 km or less. 
This proximity will permit images of 20 meters resolution that are 
comparable to the Viking imagery of Mars. 
result in new and detailed knowledge of the surfaces o f  the satellites, 
including extremely interesting features such as the active volcanoes of Io, 
the innermost of the four Jovian satellites. 
determine the composition, temperature, and activity o f  Io’s volcanic plumes 
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and volcanic flows over the duration of the orbital investigations. In a - 
manner similar to the investigation of the interior of Jupiter, gravitation 
data may determine whether Io has a completely molten core, a-s some theories 
suggest. 
The Jovian magnetosphere is the region of space under the dominant 
influence of Jupiter's magnetic field. 
visible from Earth, would appear several times larger than the full moon. 
The results of brief flyby measurements of four previous spacecraft have 
determined that the Jovian magnetosphere is much more complex and dynamic 
than had been anticipated from Earth-based measurements and theoretical 
extrapolations from the Earth's magnetosphere. The outer regions of the 
Jovi an magnetosphere expand and contract by mi 1 1  ions of ki 1 ometers in 
response to solar wind and internal forces. (The solar wind comprises the 
magnetic fields, protons (hydrogen nuclei), electrons, and ions of other 
elements from the Sun.) The inner regions of the Jovian magnetosphere are 
influenced by Jupiter's rapid spin (one revolution each 10 hours) and by the 
large quantities of sulfur and oxygen atoms emanating from Io. Jupiter also 
is a "1 aboratory" for studying phenomena appl icable to other astrophysical 
objects and to processes of ionized gases in general. The Galileo mission 
will explore these phenomena with new and more sophisticated 
instrumentation. Furthermore, the investigations of this dynamic 
environment will extend over nearly 2 years. 
magnetosphere will be explored, as well as repeated penetrations into the 
inner regions. The mission will include at least one long orbit into the 
"magnetotail," a distended, cone-shaped region formed as the solar wind 
sweeps the magnetic field back away from the planet. This mission will 
provide the results of measurements which, in detail and specificity,. can 
not conceivably be made from Earth or from Earth orbit. 
It is an immense structure that, if 
New regions o f  the outer 
1.1.2 Ulvsses Mission 
The scientific objectives for the Ulysses mission are to conduct 
studies of the Sun and'the heliosphere (i.e., the regions o f  space for which 
the Sun provides the primary influence) over a wide and unexplored range of 
heliographic latitudes. The Sun controls the Earth's environment to such an 
extent that small changes in solar conditions can have a measurable effect 
upon the Earth's climate. 
direct information on stellar phenomena. The Sun and its heliosphere 
constitute a giant astrophysical laboratory that can provide information on 
the behavior and interaction of magnetic fields, ionized gases, and 
energet i c part i cl es . 
The Sun is the nearest star, and thus provides 
All previous spacecraft that have studied the Sun and the heliosphere 
have done so in, or near, the ecliptic plane. 
plane in which the Earth and other planets orbit the Sun.) Because of the 
structure and dynamics of the Sun's magnetic field and its solar wind, it is 
anticipated that fundamentally different phenomena will be observed in the 
polar regions (high he1 iographic latitudes). 
intermediate heliographic latitudes are expected to be different from either 
the ecliptic or polar regions. 
approximately 27 days, all long-term phenomena on the solar surface are 
obscured from view half the time; this will not be true 'for viewing from the 
(The ecliptic plane is the 
Even some phenomena at 
Also, due to the solar rotation period of 
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polar regions. 
the Sun, will provide unique data that will increase the scientific 
knowledge of the Sun and the heliosphere. 
solar corona (the Sun‘s outer atmosphere), the solar wind, the magnetic 
field, solar and non-solar cosmic rays, and interstellar and interplanetary 
neutral gas and dust. Other scientific areas also will be studied. 
The Ulysses spacecraft, by flying over the polar regions of 
The principal scientific areas of study for the Ulysses mission are the 
The complex interaction of the Sun’s magnetic field, and its solar wind 
in the heliosphere, concentrate most o f  the activity and influence on other 
phenomena to low heliographic latitudes about the ecliptic. Out of this 
region, other astrophysical phenomena can be observed. For example, cosmic 
rays, which are energetic particles, consisting primarily of hydrogen and 
he1 i um nuclei , and a1 so some nuclei of heavier elements. Sol ar-produced 
cosmic rays are slowed down by the solar wind. 
arriving from other parts of the galaxy have their low-energy components 
swept away by the solar wind. At high heliographic latitudes, these solar 
and non-solar cosmic rays will be observed in a relatively undisturbed 
state. 
Non-solar cosmic rays 
The study of the Sun’s corona from high heliographic latitudes will be 
important because not all of the corona’s properties can be observed from 
the plane of the ecliptic. New infohation will be obtained on other 
properties of the sun, including solar flares, solar radio noise, and solar 
x-rays. 
Helium particles are an important source of information on the state of 
the interstellar gas in the vicinity of the solar system, but they are 
extremely difficult to detect. 
make the first direct measurements of neutral helium in the heliosphere. 
Measurements of dust particles throughout the heliosphere will provide 
information on how circumstellar dust clouds develop. 
The Ulysses spacecraft has been designed to 
Gamma rays are photons with extremely high energies compared to 
visible light, ultraviolet light, or x-rays, and usually result from large 
astrophysical phenomena. By triangulating gamma ray bursts over long 
distance baseline detectors, scientists will be able to locate the sources 
of cosmic gamma ray bursts. 
long distance baseline using the Ulysses gamma ray detectors. 
The Ulysses trajectory will provide such a 
Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity predicts the existence of 
These gravitational waves may be caused by gravitational waves in space. 
the collapse of stars or other astrophysical objects into massive 
black holes. Analyses of trajectory data from the Ulysses mission may detect 
such gravitational waves. 
The Ulysses trajectory and spacecraft science instruments permit 
several secondary mission objectives, including the investigation of the 
space environment between the planets, and a study o f  the space environment 
contained within the magnetic field of Jupiter. 
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1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 
The purpose o f  the proposed ac t i on  i s  t o  continue mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the 
G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  and use the STS/IUS launch veh ic le  
con f igu ra t i on  t o  preserve the op t i on  o f  1989 and 1990 launches. 
mod i f i ca t i ons  are t o  enable the  replacement o f  the Centaur G-Prime upper 
stage o r i g i n a l l y  planned f o r  the 1986 launch. 
These 
1.3 NEED FOR THE ACTION 
Planetary missions can be launched on ly  a t  l i m i t e d  t imes when t h e  
p l  anets are a1 igned appropr ia te ly .  
windows" and occur a t  approximately 18-month i n t e r v a l s  f o r  G a l i l e o  and 
13-month i n t e r v a l s  f o r  Ulysses. 
adverse cos t  and programmatic impacts r e s u l t .  
These a1 ignments are c a l l  ed "1 aunch 
I f  a launch window i s  missed, then ser ious 
The mod i f i ca t i ons  o f  t he  spacecraft addressed i n  t h i s  E I S  are necessary 
t o  a l l ow  the  missions t o  accomplish t h e i r  s c i e n t i f i c  ob jec t i ves  as p resen t l y  
scheduled. The proposed a c t i o n  i s  t o  continue w i t h  mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the  
Gal i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  t o  use the STS w i t h  the IUS w h i l e  conducting 
the d e t a i l e d  s a f e t y  and environmental analyses. This a c t i o n  i s  necessary t o  
preserve t h e  launch oppor tun i ty  for t h e  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecra f t  i n  
October 1989 and October 1990, respect ive ly .  
increase costs, delay s c i e n t i f i c  re turns,  threaten f u r t h e r  l o s s  o f  key per-  
sonnel, and threaten the  performance o f  spacecraft systems due t o  s h e l f - l i f e  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  spacecraf t  components. 
Any delay i n  the launch w i l l  
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I 2. ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION 
This  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) Environmental Impact Statement ( E I S )  addresses the 
poss ib le  environmental impacts associated w i t h  proceeding w i t h  mod i f i ca t i ons  
t o  the  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  t o  maintain t h e i r  launch oppor tun i t i es  
i n  October 1989 and October 1990, respect ive ly .  Add i t i ona l  Nat ional  
Environmental P o l i c y  Act (NEPA) r e l a t e d  documentation w i l l  be prepared f o r  
each mission us ing d e t a i l e d  safety  and environmental data from the  safety 
v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  and analys is  a c t i v i t i e s .  These analyses w i l l  evaluate the 
environmental imp1 i c a t i o n s  associated with t h e  completion and operat ion o f  
each mission. 
2.1 ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 
This  sec t i on  o f  t h i s  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) E I S  discusses t h e  f o l l o w i n g  program 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  decisionmakers: 
0 Continue w i t h  modi f icat ions t o  the  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  
t o  use t h e  STS wi th  the IUS i n  place of the Centaur G-Prime upper 
stage and adopting the Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravi ty -Ass i  s t  (VEEGA) 
t r a j e c t o r y  f o r  t he  G a l i l e o  mission. This  w i l l  a l l ow  the  launch 
oppor tun i t y  f o r  t he  G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  i n  October 1989 t o  be 
preserved wh i l e  conducting d e t a i l e d  safety and environmental 
analyses, and a l so  w i l l  a l l ow  the necessary up - f ron t  IUS 
i n t e g r a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  t he  Ulysses launch planned i n  1990 t o  
be performed i n  a t imely ,  programmatical ly sound manner. 
.0 Delay the  program, i nc lud ing  stopping mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the  space- 
c r a f t ,  u n t i l  t he  Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the  add i t i ona l  
NEPA r e l a t e d  documentation f o r  completion and operat ion o f  the 
missions are completed, prec lud ing a launch o f  G a l i l e o  i n  1989 but 
s t i l l  a l l ow ing  a Ulysses launch i n  1990 ( o r  1991 f o r  both 
spacecraf t ) ,  and using the STS o r  the T i t a n  I V  launch veh ic le  
con f igu ra t i on .  
Continue wi th  e i t h e r  the G a l i l e o  o r  Ulyss.es mission and cancel the 
o the r  mission. 
0 
0 Adopt t h e  no-act ion a l t e r n a t i v e ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  te rm ina t ion  o f  the 
f u r t h e r  commitment o f  resources t o  both missions. 
2 .2  DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION TO CONTINUE AS PLANNED WITH 
MODIFICATIONS OF THE SPACECRAFT TO PRESERVE A LAUNCH OPPORTUNITY I N  
1989 FOR GALILEO AND 1990 FOR ULYSSES 
The change i n  the upper stage w i l l  r e q u i r e  a change i n  the f l i g h t  
t r a j e c t o r y  f o r  t h e  G a l i l e o  mission from t h a t  o f  a d i r e c t  f l i g h t  t o  J u p i t e r  
t o  the VEEGA t r a j e c t o r y ,  as described l a t e r  i n  t h i s  sect ion.  
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2.2.1 ProDosed Modifications to the Galileo and Ulvsses Missions 
2.2.1.1 Gal i 1 eo Mi ssion Modi f i cations 
Overview of Mission Modifications 
The spacecraft was to travel on a direct trajectory to Jupiter, where it 
would arrive in approximately 30 months. 
Challenger accident, NASA rescheduled the mission for launch in October 
1989, the earliest available launch window consistent with resumption of 
Shuttle flight activities. 
the Shuttle Centaur for safety reasons unrelated to Galileo. 
cancellation of the Centaur required a change of upper stage and a new 
trajectory. 
were required for the spacecraft. The launch vehicle, spacecraft, and 
trajectory changes re1 evant to potenti a1 environmental impact concerns are 
discussed below. 
The Galileo mission previously was scheduled for launch in May 1986. 
Following the January 1986 
On June 20, 1986, NASA cancelled development of 
Because of the change in trajectory, a number of modifications 
The 
launch Vehicle Chanae 
With cancellation of the Centaur upper stage for the STS, NASA decided 
to replace the liquid-fueled Centaur with the IUS solid-fueled upper stage. 
The environmental impacts of the IUS relative to the Centaur when 
transported on board the shuttle vehicle are currently being assessed. In 
general, though, it is likely that the accident probability for the IUS is 
less than that for the Centaur, and the accident environment for the STS/IUS 
is less-severe than that for the STS/Centaur, as the solid fuel is more 
inert than the liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen used in the Centaur. 
Soacecraft Modifications 
Three changes in the Galileo mission have necessitated modifications to 
the design of the'spacecraft. These changes include launching in late 
October 1989 (vice, May 1986), using the VEEGA flyby trajectory, and using 
the IUS upper stage booster. The functional areas affected by these changes 
include: configuration, thermal control, mechanical devices, structure, 
cab1 ing, power margin, telecommunications, navigation, and attitude control. 
The new design requirements will necessitate the following: 
0 Altering the spacecraft configuration to accommodate the addition 
of VEEGA-re1 ated hardware and to accommodate IUS integration 
0 Making the spacecraft compatible with new thermal environment 
requirements relating to Venus' proximity to the Sun (0.69 
astronomical units), Earth radiation, meteoroids, and the STS/IUS 
vehi cl e 
0 Making the mission compatible with lower telecommunication link 
margins for mi ssion/navigation, spacecraft characterization, 
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anomaly i nvest i gat  i on, and normal performance eval ua t  i on and 
assessment ~ 
Making the  mission compatible w i t h  lower power margins. 0 
O f  t he  s p e c i f i c  spacecraf t  changes made i n  these var ious areas (see Ref. 2 
f o r  add i t i ona l  d e t a i l s ) ,  on l y  the a d d i t i o n  of Radioisotope Heater Un i t s  
(RHUs) and another r e t r o p u l s i o n  module (RPM) heater c i r c u i t  could i n f l uence  
the  p o t e n t i a l  environmental impacts o f  the mission; none o f  t he  o the r  
spacecraf t  mod i f i ca t i ons  have any s i g n i f i c a n t  near-term o r  long-term 
environmental impacts. 
. 
* To mainta in  a spacecraf t  power margin, RHUs are being added t o  t h e  
spacecraf t  i n  p a r t i a l  replacement o f  using e l e c t r i c a l  power f o r  generat ing 
heat. The t o t a l  number o f  1 Watt RHUs on board the  spacecraf t  w i l l  increase 
from 103 t o  130. Each RHU w i l l  have 31.5 Curies o f  p lutonium i n  the form o f  
a plutonium d iox ide  ceramic a t  t ime o f  launch . 
The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  environmental impacts associated w i t h  a launch-abort 
The system 
I n  the event o f  an abort- landing, two 
1 andi ng a1 so have been decreased f o r  postu l  ated accidents i n v o l v i n g  over- 
heat ing and subsequent explosion o f  t he  RPM's p r o p e l l a n t  tanks. 
f o r  s h u t t i n g  down the  RPM heaters powered by the  Radioisotope Thermoelectr ic 
Generators (RTGs) has been made l e s s  suscept ib le t o  f a i l u r e  by adding a 
second c i r c u i t  t o  the  spacecraft.  
d i f f e r e n t  c i r c u i t s  e x i s t  t h a t  can shut down the  RPM heaters. Th is  
m o d i f i c a t i o n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  decreases the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  p r o p e l l a n t  tank 
overheating. Studies are underway t o  evaluate the  pre-depl oyment o f  ground 
coo l i ng  u n i t s  a t  abor t  landing s i t e s  t o  s a t i s f y  post - landing sa fe ty  
requirements. Other a1 t e r n a t i v e s  a1 so are being considered. 
2.2.1.2 Ulysses Mission Mod i f i ca t i ons  
Overview o f  Mission Mod i f i ca t i ons  
The Ulysses mission prev ious ly  was scheduled f o r  launch i n  May 1986 
aboard the  STS/Centaur. NASA i s  now planning t o  launch the mission i n  1990 
using the STS/IUS wi th  an add i t i ona l  Payload Ass i s t  Module (PAM-S) stage. . 
Besides t h i s  change i n  launch vehic le,  the Ulysses mission plans no space- 
c r a f t  o r  t r a j e c t o r y  changes t h a t  could i n f l uence  the  p o t e n t i a l  environmental 
impacts o f  t he  mission. 
Launch Vehic le Mod i f i ca t i ons  
discussed above. 
are c u r r e n t l y  under review. 
The p o t e n t i a l  changes i n  the Ulysses mission re levan t  t o  the  I U S  are 
The PAM-S poss ib le  accident environments and p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
'The RHUs each w i l l  have 31.5 Curies o f  plutonium a t  t ime o f  launch, 
assuming the launch w i l l  be i n  1989. 
w i l l  have 31.2 Curies. 
w i l l  be 135,000 f o r  1989 and 134,000 f o r  1990. 
inc lude the Cur ie l e v e l s  o f  daughter products. 
I f  the launch i s  i n  1990, the RHUs 
The Curies l e v e l s  f o r  each RTG a t  t ime o f  launch 
These estimates do no t  
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Soacec r a f t  Modi f i c a t i  ons 
brackets, no mod i f i ca t i ons  are requi red f o r  the spacecraft.  
Except f o r  minor changes associated w i t h  adapters and mounting 
2.2.2 Mission DeSCriDtiOn 
2.2.2.1 G a l i l e o  Mission 
The Gal i l e o  spacecraf t  cons is ts  o f  an o r b i t e r  and an atmospheric e n t r y  
No combination o f  launch vehic les p resen t l y  ava i l ab le  t o  NASA has probe. 
t he  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  place the  G a l i l e o  spacecraft on a d i r e c t  t r a j e c t o r y  from 
Earth t o  J u p i t e r .  Therefore, the G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  w i l l  be launched toward 
Venus where i t  w i l l  execute a f l yby  maneuver and head back toward the  Earth. 
It w i l l  then f l y  by the  Earth tw ice  i n  order t o  ga in s u f f i c i e n t  energy t o  
reach J u p i t e r .  These f l y b y s  use the g r a v i t a t i o n a l  f i e l d s  o f  Earth and Venus 
t o  ga in  s u f f i c i e n t  v e l o c i t y  t o  proceed t o  J u p i t e r .  Figure 2-1  i l l u s t r a t e s  
the Gal i l e o  spacecraf t  t r a j e c t o r y .  Af ter  a r r i v i n g  a t  Jup i te r ,  t he  o r b i t e r  
w i l l  f l y  by the  moon I o  p r i o r  t o  o r b i t i n g  J u p i t e r  and i t s  moons. The 
o r b i t e r  w i l l  conduct a study o f  Jup i te r ' s  atmosphere and the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  t h e  space environment surrounding J u p i t e r .  The atmospheric e n t r y  probe, 
w h i c h  i s  t o  be re leased  pr ior  t o  the arr ival  o f  the o r b i t e r  a t  Jup i ter ,  w i l l  
descend i n t o  J u p i t e r ' s  atmosphere. During the  descent, s c i e n t i f i c  
measurements w i l l  be made t o  determine the  s t r u c t u r e  and composit ion o f  the 
Jovian atmosphere. The data w i l l  be relayed t o  Earth by the  o r b i t e r .  
2.2.2.2 Ulysses Mission 
The Ulysses mission i s  a j o i n t  e f f o r t  conducted by the  European Space 
Agency (ESA) and NASA. ESA i s  responsible f o r  developing and operat ing the 
spacecraf t  and f o r  about h a l f  o f  the experiments conducted du r ing  the 
mission. NASA i s  responsible f o r  p rov id ing  the launch by the  STS/IUS/PAM-S, 
the remaining experiments, and mission support using the  communications and 
spacecraf t  t r a c k i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  NASA's Deep Space Network. 
No combination o f  launch vehic les a v a i l a b l e  t o  NASA has the c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  launch the  spacecraf t  on a t r a j e c t o r y  from Earth d i r e c t l y  over the  Sun's 
poles. 
t he  p lanet  t o  ga in speed and subsequently t u r n  back and head ou t  o f  the 
e c l i p t i c  plane toward the  p o l a r  regions o f  the Sun. Since Ulysses i s  a 
substant i  a1 l y  smal l e r  spacecraft than Gal i 1 eo (approximately 800 1 bs f o r  
Ulysses vs approximately 6,000 l b s  f o r  Gal i leo) ,  the I U S  can generate 
s u f f i c i e n t  v e l o c i t y  t o  enable a d i r e c t  f l i g h t  t o  J u p i t e r .  Figure 2-2 
i l l u s t r a t e s  the  t r a j e c t o r y  o f  the Ulysses spacecraft.  
Therefore, Ulysses w i l l  f i r s t  f l y  t o  J u p i t e r  t o  use the g r a v i t y  o f  
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2.2.3 Mission Phases and La unch ODera t i o n s  
2.2.3.1 Mission Phases 
There are several i d e n t i f i a b l e  phases f o r  the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses 
missions r e l a t i v e  t o  the  STS/IUS launch veh ic le  con f igu ra t i on .  All launch 
vehic les and both missions have the  f o l l o w i n g  launch phases: 
0 Pre-launch - s t a r t s  a few days p r i o r  t o  launch w i t h  the  
i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  t h e  RTGs on the  spacecraf t  a t  t he  launch pad. 
Fol lowing RTG i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  the l i q u i d  p rope l l an ts  f o r  t he  launch 
vehic les are loaded. 
p rope l l an ts  ( i .e.,  l i q u i d  hydrogen and l i q u i d  oxygen) occurs a few 
hours before 1 aunch. 
This loading o f  t he  low-temperature 
0 Launch-to-Earth-Orbit  - s t a r t s  w i t h  i g n i t i o n  o f  t he  launch veh ic le  
s o l i d  rocket  boosters (SRBs) and l i f t - o f f  from the  launch pad. 
L i q u i d  and s o l i d  p rope l l an t  stages are used by a l l  launch veh ic le  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  boost t he  payload i n t o  Earth o r b i t .  
0 E a r t h - O r b i t  - s t a r t s  with c u t - o f f  o f  the launch v e h i c l e  l i q u i d  
p r o p e l l a n t  stages a t  t h e  t ime t h a t  the launch v e h i c l e  obtains 
E a r t h - o r b i t  v e l o c i t y .  The launch veh ic le  then coasts f o r  a per iod 
o f  several hours. This coast ing pe r iod  continues u n t i l  t he  launch 
v e h i c l e  i s  p roper l y  prepared and pos i t ioned f o r  t he  next phase. 
0 Earth-Orb i t  EscaDe - s t a r t s  w i t h  i g n i t i o n  o f  t he  IUS upper stage. 
This  phase ends w i t h  the spacecraft both separated from the  upper 
stage and de l i ve red  t o  i t s  deep space t r a j e c t o r y .  
For t h e  STS/IUS, a Launch-Abort-Landing phase a lso must be considered. 
This  phase on ly  would be re levan t  if an STS/IUS o r  spacecraf t  problem 
occurred t h a t  caused the O r b i t e r  and payload t o  r e t u r n  t o  Earth before 
denpl oying t h e  spacecraft i n t o  o r b i t .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  G a l i l e o  mission a lso has an Earth-Return-Flvbv phase 
because none o f  t h e  launch veh ic le  a l t e r n a t i v e s  has s u f f i c i e n t  c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  launch t h e  spacecraf t  on a d i r e c t  t r a j e c t o r y  t o  Jup i te r .  
f l y b y s  o f  Earth and Venus t o  ga in s u f f i c i e n t  v e l o c i t y  from the  g r a v i t a t i o n a l  
f i e l d s  o f  t h e  p lanets  t o  proceed t o  Jup i te r .  F o r  t he  mission, two Earth- 
r e t u r n  f l y b y s  are used (see Figure 2-1).  
G a l i l e o  makes 
2.2.3.2 Mission Safety A f t e r  Launch 
The mission sa fe ty  act ions subject  t o  human i n t e r v e n t i o n  a f t e r  launch 
t h a t  are re levan t  t o  t h i s  E I S  f o r  a l l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and both missions are: 
range safety,  abort  l m d i n g s ,  cance l l a t i on  o f  spacecraf t  deployment, and 
Ear th reen t ry .  
2-7 
Ranae Safety 
The Eastern Space and M i s s i l e  Center a t  P a t r i c k  A i r  Force Base i s  
responsib le  f o r  range sa fe ty  (i.e., t he  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  l i f e  and proper ty  
through t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  monitor c l o s e l y  launch veh ic le  performance and 
dest roy the  launch veh ic le  t o  prevent damage o r  accident from ground impact 
o f  the  i n t a c t  launch veh ic le )  dur ing  NASA launches a t  the  Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC). 
have a range sa fe ty  system t h a t  permits immediate de tec t i on  o f  any dev ia t i on  
f r o m  the  nominal launch t r a j e c t o r y .  
t he  launch veh ic le  cons t i t u tes  a hazard t o  l i f e  o r  property,  t h e  Range 
Safety O f f i c e r  has the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  dest roy the  launch veh ic le .  
To s a t i s f y  range sa fe ty  requirements, a l l  launch vehic les 
I f  i t  i s  determined dur ing  launch t h a t  
Abort Landinas an d Cancel 1 a t  i on o f  SDacecraft DeDl ovment 
Pre-def ined launch-abort  sequences w i l l  be ac t i va ted  dur ing  t h e  Launch- 
to -Ear th -Orb i t  phase i f  the  STS f l i g h t  crew o r  the  on board computers sense 
mal funct ions t h a t  would prevent the  O r b i t e r  from sa fe l y  reaching Ear th 
o r b i t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  once i n  the  Ear th-Orb i t  phase, spacecraf t  deployment w i l l  
be cancel led and t h e  spacecraf t  w i l l  be re turned t o  Earth according t o  pre- 
def ined miss ion operat ion r u l e s  i f  NASA determines t h a t  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
deployment and d e l i v e r y  o f  t h i s  spacecraf t  t o  i t s  deep space t r a j e c t o r y  i s  
no t  feas ib le .  Other f a i l u r e  modes may be i d e n t i f i e d  t h a t  may i nvo l ve  
leav ing  the  spacecraf t  i n  low Earth o r b i t .  However, i n  any event, t he  RTG 
modules are designed t o  surv ive  reen t ry  cond i t ions  associated w i t h  t h i s  
phase o f  t he  mission. 
Ear th  Reentry 
Ear th r e e n t r y  could occur from Earth o r b i t ,  f o r  instance due t o  an 
upper stage malfunct ion,  or ,  i n  the  case o f  Gal i leo,  due t o  spacecraf t  
mal funct ion o r  nav iga t ion  e r r o r  dur ing  a VEEGA f l y b y .  The environmental 
imp l i ca t i ons  o f  an Ear th reen t ry  are being inves t iga ted  as p a r t  o f  t he  
d e t a i l e d  sa fe ty  and environmental data being developed. As p a r t  o f  the  
VEEGA mission design, t he  Ga l i l eo  p r o j e c t  i s  conducting an Ear th Avoidance 
analys is .  Sect ion 4 o f  t h i s  E I S  presents the  r e s u l t s  o f  t h a t  analys is .  
2.2.4 Launch O m o r t u n i t v  Considerations 
Both the  Ga l i l eo  and Ulysses missions can be launched on ly  dur ing  
s p e c i f i c  periods, o r  launch windows, depending on the  pos i t i ons  o f  t he  
p lanets  and the  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  ava i l ab le  launch vehic les.  
programmatic cons t ra in t s  associated w i t h  resumption o f  Shu t t l e  operations, 
the f i r s t  oppor tun i ty  f o r  the  launch o f  Ga l i l eo  occurs dur ing  October 1989, 
and f o r  Ulysses occurs dur ing  October 1990. The next f e a s i b l e  launch 
oppor tun i t ies  occur i n  May/June 1991 f o r  Ga l i l eo  and October 1990 and 
November 1991 f o r  Ulysses. 
Due t o  
When a mission delay causes a launch oppor tun i ty  t o  be missed, 
spacecraf t  t r a j e c t o r i e s  and mission operat ions must be redesigned and 
genera l l y  mission budgets must be augmented. The redesign o f  mission 
operat ions requ i res  new plans f o r  communications, spacecraf t  t rack ing,  and. 
mission operat ion f a c i l i t i e s  support. These new plans a f f e c t  no t  on ly  the 
2 -a 
. 
delayed missions, but also other missions that depend on the resources of 
Because of the specialized nature o f  space exploration 
missions such as Galileo and Ulysses, trained personnel and the use of 
supporting facilities must be retained when missions are delayed between 
launch opportunities. 
Furthermore, avai 1 able spacecraft power must be reconsidered when RTGs 
are required for a mission. RTG power levels decline with time. 
missed launch opportunities may require expensive refueling of existing 
spacecraft RTGs or may require mission p.1 anners to restrict mission 
objectives. 
- these facilities. 
Therefore, 
2.2.5 SDacec raft DescriDtions 
2.2.5.1 Gal i 1 eo Spacecraft 
The Galileo spacecraft consists of an orbiter and an atmospheric entry 
The spacecraft is probe and weighs 6,000 pounds (see Figures 2-3 and 2-4). 
spin-stabilized, but incorporates a despun section for certain scientific 
equipment. The part of the spacecraft that is de-spun will provide a steady 
platform for remote-sensing instruments, which must be precisely pointed. 
The other part o f  the spacecraft will spin at three revolutions per minute 
to allow its instruments to "sweep" the sky continuously to make their 
measurements. The spinning part of the spacecraft contains communication 
antennas, the spacecraft propulsion subsystem, the RTGs, most .of the 
electronics and communications equipment, and various science instruments. 
The portions of the spacecraft that are relevant to the assessment of 
potenti a1 environmental impacts are the power, temperature control, and 
propulsion subsystems. 
of interest are the two RTGs in the power subsystem, the RHUS in the 
temperature control subsystem, and the propel 1 ants in the atti tude control 
and propulsion subsystem. 
The particular elements of these subsystems that are 
' 2.2.5.2 Ulysses Spacecraft 
The Ulysses spacecraft weighs 805 pounds and is illustrated in Figure 
2-5. The spacecraft is spin-stabilized with an antenna on top, one RTG, a 
boom used for selected scientific experiments, and a main body that contains 
the remainder of the science experiments and the spacecraft subsystems. 
The portions of the spacecraft that are relevant to assessing potential 
environmental impacts are the power and propulsion subsystems. The particu- 
lar elements of these subsystems that are of interest are RTG use in the 
power subsystem and the propellants in the attitude control and propulsion 
subsystem. 
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2.2.6 Power Sources 
2.2.6.1 Consideration of Alternative Power Sources 
The power requirements for the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft include 
the foll owing performance cri teri a: 
Safe passage through the asteroid belt 
Prolonged operation in the intense radiation field of Jupiter 
Sufficient power to operate at Jupiter’s distance from the Sun 
Sufficient power to function for at least 43 months after the 
Jupiter encounter 
( 4 j  
(5) Low weight-to-power ratio 
(6) Maximum reliability. 
RTGs are the only available power sources that meet all six 
requirements. Alternatives to the RTGs as a source of electrical power for 
the spacecraft were considered. These alternatives included solar cells, 
fuel cells, batteries, nuclear reactors, and radioisotope dynamic 
generators. Sol ar cell s cannot meet requi rements (1) through (4) because 
solar cells are susceptible to impacts with interplanetary dust particles, 
their performance will degrade in the intense radiation field of Jupiter, 
and the intensity o f  the Sun near Jupiter is about 25 times less than that 
at Earth. Fuel cells and batteries cannot meet requirements (4) and (5) 
because of their lower power densities relative to weight, thus requiring 
more launch energy than is available. Other nuclear power sources such as 
nuclear reactors and radioisotope-driven dynamic generators are not 
avai 1 ab1 e. 
2.2.6.2 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) 
Electrical power for the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft will be 
obtained from RTGs. 
minimum of 285 Watts at the beginning o f  each mission. 
on 22 previous space missions. 
NASA’s most impressive successes, including Voyager, Pioneer, Viking, and 
all but the first of the manned Apollo landings on the Moon. Each RTG has a 
heat source and a thermoelectric converter that converts heat into 
electricity. The locations of the RTGs on the Galileo and Ulysses 
spacecraft were provided in Figures 2-3 and 2-5, respectively. 
Each RTG (see Figure 2-6) is designed to provide a 
RTGs have been used 
These applications have included some o f  
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) safety philosophy for the design 
of the RTG requires containment or immobilization of the plutonium fuel 
to the maximum extent possible during all mission phases, including ground 
handling, launch, and unplanned events such as reentry, impact, and 
post-impact situations. 
The RTG consists of a heat source and a thermoelectric converter. The 
RTG heat source consists of a stacked column of 18 individual modules. Each 
general purpose heat source (GPHS) module contains one graphite block, 
call ed an aeroshell that encases two graphite cy1 inders call ed graphite 
impact shells (see Figure 2-7). Each cylinder contains two pellets o f  
plutonium dioxide encased in iridium/tungsten alloy metal. 
blocks provide protection against atmospheric heating and subsequent release 
o f  the plutonium dioxide in the event that the modules are released in an 
The graphite 
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accident and fall back to Earth. 
from ground or debris impacts in the event of an accident. 
tungsten metal contains the fuel and provides an additional layer of 
protection. 
largely of the Pu-238 isotope. 
composition of the 9.540 kgs of plutonium used to manufacture an RTG (see 
Ref. 12).  
The graphite cylinders provide protection 
The iridium/ 
The plutonium dioxide generates heat by the natural radioactive decay 
Table 2-1 provides a breakdown and isotopic 
TABLE 2-1. ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF PLUTONIUM USED TO MANUFACTURE AN RTG* 
Plutonium Weight Half-Life Radioactivity Total 
Isotope Percent (Years) (Curi es/gram of Curies 
pl utoni um) (11/89) 
236 
238 
239 
240 
241 
242 
Other TRU 
isotopes 
TOTALS 
(10'6 
83.880 
13.490 
1.900 
0.379 
0.124 
0.228 
100.00 
2.85 532 <1 
87.7 17.1 130,050 
24,100 0.0621 80.2 
6,560 0.227 41.3 
14.4 103.2 2,650 
376,000 0.00393 <1 
3.3 
132,825 
*Based on values from Table A-1 ,  Ref.32. 
Until the RTGs are transported to the KSC, they will be stored at a DOE 
facility. A few days before launch, the RTGs will be installed on the 
spacecraft. 
2.2.7 Radioisotooe Heater Units (RHUS) 
portions of the orbiter/atmospheric entry probe temperature within 
acceptable limits, to minimize the use of electrical power for thermal 
control, and to reduce electromagnetic interference. 
about 1 Watt of heat derived from the radioactive decay of 31.5 Curies of 
plutonium-238. The plutonium (in the form of a plutonium dioxide pellet) 
for each RHU is contained within a platinum-rhodium alloy capsule. Similar 
to the RTGs, each RHU is encased in a graphite insulator surrounded by a 
graphite block to provide protection from atmospheric heating and ground or 
debris impact in the event of an accident (see Figure 2-8 ) .  
The Galileo spacecraft will use approximately 130 RHUs to maintain 
Each RHU provides 
The RHUs are 
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. designed t o  be 1 ightweight  u n i t s  capable o f  conta in ing the plutonium d iox ide  
fuel i n  a l l  c r e d i b l e  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  both normal operat ions and accidents. 
The l o c a t i o n s  o f  RHUs on the  G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  are shown i n  Figure 2-9. 
The on ly  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  the G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  RHUs would be the 
a d d i t i o n  o f  another RTG, which would r e s u l t  i n  an unacceptable weight 
increase f o r  t h e  spacecraft. 
2.2.8 SDacecraft ProDul s i o n  Subsvs t em 
The G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  uses monomethyl hydrazine f u e l  and n i t rogen  
t e t r o x i d e  o x i d i z e r  f o r  i t s  propuls ion subsystem. 
t i o n  i s  hypergol ic  (i .e., the p rope l l an ts  i g n i t e  spontaneously upon contact  
w i t h  each other) .  
hydrazine, which spontaneously i g n i t e s  by c a t a l y t i c  decomposition w i t h i n  the 
propuls ion subsystem t h r u s t  chambers. 
e f f i c i e n t ,  space-storable (i .e., can be s tored wi thout  any special  
temperature c o n t r o l  equipment) p rope l l an ts  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t he  missions, and 
the  use o f  any o the r  space-storable p rope l l an ts  would r e s u l t  i n  unacceptable 
weight increases f o r  t he  spacecraft.  The p r o p e l l a n t  tanks o f  both 
spacecraf t  are loaded a t  t he  KSC. The G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  c a r r i e s  807 pounds 
o f  monomethyl hydrazine and 1,293.6 pounds o f  n i t rogen  t e t r o x i d e .  The 
Ulvsses m a c e c r a f t  c a r r i e s  74 pounds o f  hydrazine. NASA has w e s c r i b e d  
This  p r o p e l l a n t  combina- 
The Ulysses spacecraf t  propuls ion subsystem uses 
These combinations are the  most 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  concerning the  storage and- hand1 i n g  o f  these propel 1 ants 
(Ref. 3 ) .  
2.2.9 l a u  nch Vehic le Oesc ri D t  i ons 
NASA‘s launch v e h i c l e  f o r  t he  launch oppor tun i ty  a v a i l a b l e  i n  October 
1989 f o r  G a l i l e o  and October 1990 f o r  Ulysses i s  t he  STS w i t h  an IUS 
(supplemented by a PAM-S t h i r d  stage f o r  t he  Ulysses mission).  
launch c o n f i g u r a t i o n  cons is t s  of the STS S h u t t l e  booster w i t h  an IUS t h a t  i s  
c a r r i e d  t o  Earth o r b i t  i n  the  Shu t t l e  bay. 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  spacecraf t  i n  the  Shu t t l e  bay f o r  launch. 
The STS/IUS 
Figure 2-10 i l l u s t r a t e s  the  
The STS cons is t s  o f  a p i l o t e d  reusable veh ic le  ( t h e  O r b i t e r )  mounted on 
a non-reusable External  Tank (ET) conta in ing l i q u i d  hydrogen and oxygen 
propel 1 ants and two recoverable and reusable Sol i d  Rocket Boosters (SRBs) . 
The O r b i t e r  has th ree  main rocket  engines and a cargo bay 60 f e e t  long by 15 
f e e t  i n  diameter (Ref. 28).  
A t  launch, both SRBs and the Orb i ter ’s  rocket  engines burn simultane- 
ously. When the  S h u t t l e  veh ic le  a t t a i n s  an a l t i t u d e  o f  approximately 27 
miles, t he  SRBs are j e t t i s o n e d  and subsequently recovered f r o m  the ocean. 
The ET i s  j e t t i s o n e d  before the O r b i t e r  goes i n t o  Earth o r b i t .  
O rb i te r ’ s  O r b i t a l  Maneuvering System (OMS) i s  then used t o  propel the 
O r b i t e r  i n t o  the des i red Earth o r b i t .  
O r b i t e r  out  o f  o r b i t .  The O r b i t e r  i s  p i l o t e d  back t o  Earth f o r  an unpowered 
landing. A d e t a i l e d  desc r ip t i on  o f  the STS Shu t t l e  has been provided i n  the 
Shu t t l e  Data Book (Ref. 28). 
The 
The OMS a lso i s  used t o  take the 
The I U S  extends the Space Shutt le ’s reach beyond the Shut t le ’s  highest 
achievable a l t i t u d e .  A f t e r  deployment f r o m  the Shut t le ,  the I U S  can propel 
payloads i n t o  higher Earth o r b i t s  o r  t o  Earth-escape v e l o c i t i e s ,  t he  l a t t e r  
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o f  which i s  needed f o r  deep space missions. 
f o r  use w i t h  the  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions i s  a two-stage s o l i d  rocket  
(Ref. 4). 
spacecraft assembled w i t h  the IUS f o r  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses, respec t i ve l y .  
The PAM-S i s  a s o l i d  rocket  booster t h a t  would be used as an add i t i ona l  
stage separate from the  two-stage IUS. The PAM-S i s  f i r e d  a f t e r  t h e  I U S  
burn has been completed. The Ulysses mission requ i res  t h e  PAM-S t o  achieve 
the  add i t i ona l  v e l o c i t y  needed t o  d e l i v e r  the spacecraf t  onto i t s  deep space 
t r a j e c t o r y  . 
The vers ion o f  t he  I U S  proposed 
Figures 2-11 and 2-12 i l l u s t r a t e  the c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  the 
2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE ALTERNATIVE TO DELAY THE PROGRAM, INCLUDING STOPPING 
MODIFICATIONS TO THE SPACECRAFT, UNTIL THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AND 
THE ADDITIONAL NEPA RELATED DOCUMENTATION ARE COMPLETE, PRECLUDING A 
LAUNCH OF GALILEO I N  1989, BUT STILL ALLOWING A ULYSSES LAUNCH I N  1990 
This  a l t e r n a t i v e  would i nvo l ve  the  suspension o f  t h e  m o d i f i c a t i o n  t o  
the  spacecraf t  u n t i l  the SARs and add i t i ona l  NEPA r e l a t e d  documentation are 
completed. I n  the  event t h a t  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  selected, t he  G a l i l e o  
spacecraf t  could n o t  be ready f o r  launch i n  October 1989. The Ulysses 
spacecraf t  could be launched i n  October 1990 i f  programmatic a c t i v i t i e s  and 
preparat ion costs  c u r r e n t l y  shared w i t h  G a l i l e o  r e l a t e d  t o  RTG safety,  RTG 
c o o l i n g  requirements, and I U S  i n t e g r a t i o n  were picked up by Ulysses through 
a budget supplement t o  cover Gal i leo ’s  p o r t i o n  o f  the shared costs.  E i t h e r  
spacecraf t  could be launched i n  1991 on the STS. 
The del  ay a1 t e r n a t  i ve a1 1 ows several potent i a1 Gal i 1 eo 1 aunch vehi c l  e 
conf igurat ions,  inc lud ing:  1) the  STS/IUS c u r r e n t l y  planned, and 2) t he  use 
o f  an expendable launch veh ic le  con f igu ra t i on  such as the  T i t a n  I V / I U S .  The 
expendable launch veh ic le  (i.e., t he  T i t a n  I V )  i s  s t i l l  i n  development and‘ 
may no t  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  the 1991 launch oppor tun i t ies,  which would r e s u l t  
i n  an add i t i ona l  delay o f  a t  l e a s t  18 months f o r  G a l i l e o  and 13 months f o r  
Ulysses u n t i l  the next launch oppor tun i ty  beyond 1991. 
2.3.1 A1 t e r n a t i v e  Launch Conf iqurat ions f o r  Delaved Launches 
avai 1 ab1 e f o r  de l  ayed 1 aunches. 
r e l a t i v e  t o  the  1989 conf igurat ion.  
t he  T i t a n  I V  development program, as c u r r e n t l y  planned, w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  an 
operat ional  T i t a n  I V / I U S  by 1991 o r  T i t a n  IV/Centaur by 1993 a t  t he  
e a r l i e s t .  
However, t he  T i t a n  IV/Centaur w i l l  not  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a launch i n  the  
1989-1991 timeframe an t i c ipa ted  fo r  t he  Gal i l e o  o r  Ulysses missions and 
the re fo re  w i l l  no t  be considered f u r t h e r  i n  t h i s  E I S .  
Th is  sec t i on  discusses a l t e r n a t i v e  launch vehi’cle con f igu ra t i ons  
Table 2-2 d i  spl  ays these con f igu ra t i ons  
The T i t a n  I V  con f i gu ra t i ons  assume t h a t  
For launches beyond 1993, the  T i t a n  IV/Centaur may be avai lab le.  
2.3.1.1 Del ayed STS/IUS Conf igurat ion 
e s s e n t i a l l y  be the same as the STS/IUS launch con f igu ra t i on  discussed i n  
Section 2.2. 
spacecraf t  t o  prov ide peak power (because o f  degradation o f  RTG power 
The STS/IUS launch con f igu ra t i on  f o r  a launch i n  1989 o r  beyond would 
Other than the poss ib le  add i t i on  o f  b a t t e r i e s  t o  the G a l i l e o  
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l eve l s ) ,  t he re  are no known substant ia l  changes t h a t  would be requ i red  fo r  
a launch a f t e r  1989. 
2.3.1.2 Expendable Launch Vehic le Conf igurat ions 
For launches i n  the  e a r l y  1990's and beyond, i t  i s  expected t h a t  two 
launch veh ic le  conf igurat ions using the  T i t a n  I V  rocket  coupled w i t h  e i t h e r  
a Centaur o r  IUS could be a v a i l a b l e  t o  launch the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses 
spacecraft.  
The T i t a n  I V  has been designed t o  accept the  STS payloads. 
T i t a n  I V  cons i s t s  o f  a two-stage l i q u i d - p r o p e l l a n t  core v e h i c l e  wi th  two 
attached SRBs. Figure 2-13 provides a compar'son o f  t he  T i t a n  I V  conf igura-  
t i o n  t o  the T i t a n  I I I E  Centaur con f igu ra t i on . l  The SRBs prov ide the  i n i t i a l  
t h r u s t  a t  l i f t - o f f  f r o m  the  launch pad. A f t e r  t he  SRBs complete t h e i r  burn, 
t h e  f i r s t  stage o f  t h e  l i q u i d - p r o p e l l a n t  core i s  i g n i t e d .  Two minutes a f t e r  
i g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s  stage, t he  payload f a i r i n g  i s  j e t t i soned .  Fol lowing the  
shutdown of t he  f i r s t  stage, the second stage i s  i g n i t e d  and burns t o  com- 
p l e t i o n .  The T i t a n  I V / I U S  i s  c u r r e n t l y  being developed by the  DO0 and w i l l  
no t  be a v a i l a b l e  t o  NASA (according t o  cu r ren t  plans) u n t i l  1991. 
The 
2.3.2 SDacecraft and Mission Chancles Caused bv Oelaved Launches 
and A1 t e r n a t  i ve Conf i uura t  i onS 
There are no spacecraf t  o r  mission changes requ i red  as a r e s u l t  o f  
delays t o  1991. However, any launches beyond 1991 would necess i ta te c e r t a i n  
changes i n  the spacecraf t  and mission from those described i n  Sect ion 2.2. 
The p r i n c i p a l  changes now expected would be mission design and t r a j e c t o r y  
changes and the  poss ib le  r e f u e l i n g  o f  t he  RTGs ( f o r  missions beyond 1991) t o  
compensate f o r  t he  reduct ion i n  RTG power output due t o  rad io isotope f u e l  
decay. 
A 1991 launch o f  G a l i l e o  on board the  STS/IUS o r  T i t a n  I V / I U S  would 
r e q u i r e  the  VEEGA t r a j e c t o r y .  Operational procedures have been developed t o  
minimize t h e  chance o f  an inadver tent  Earth reen t ry  occurr ing du r ing  the 
Eart h-return- fl  yby . 
2.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUE WITH EITHER THE GALILEO OR 
ULYSSES MISSION AND CANCEL THE OTHER 
The a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  continue w i t h  e i t h e r  the G a l i l e o  o r  Ulysses mission, 
w h i l e  c a n c e l l i n g  the other  mission, would r e s u l t  i n  the  te rm ina t ion  o f  the 
f u r t h e r  commitment o f  resources t o  one of the two missions and the  l o s s  o f  
s c i e n t i f i c  re tu rns  from the cancel led mission. 
could be launched under e i t h e r  o f  t he  1 aunch scenarios discussed prev ious ly .  
The environmental considerat ions f o r  t h i s  a1 t e r n a t i v e ' a r e  the  same as those 
p rev ious l y  discussed under the  proposed ac t i on  o r  the delay a l t e r n a t i v e .  
The mission t h a t  i s  continued 
lWhereas t h e  T i t a n  I I I E  was used f o r  the Voyager missions, i t  i s  no t  l a r g e  
enough t o  s a t i s f y  the requirements o f  the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions. 
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2 .5  DESCRIPTION OF THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE 
The no-act ion a l t e r n a t i v e  would r e s u l t  i n  the te rm ina t ion  o f  t he  
f u r t h e r  commitment o f  resources t o  both missions. 
w i t h  the  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions, t he  goals o f  the NASA Solar  System 
Explorat ion Program r e l a t i n g  t o  both missions would not  be at ta ined.  
I f  NASA d i d  no t  proceed 
2.6 SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES 
No adverse environmental consequences have been i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  any o f  
t he  a l t e r n a t i v e s  evaluated above. There are, however, s i g n i f i c a n t  adverse 
programmatic, economic, and g e o p o l i t i c a l  consequences associated w i t h  a l l  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  o the r  than the proposed act ion.  
cont inue w i t h  spacecraf t  modif icat ions i n  p a r a l l e l  w i t h  ongoing sa fe ty  and 
environmental analyses, has s i g n i f i c a n t  advantages r e l a t i v e  t o  the  other  
t h r e e  a1 t e r n a t i v e s  evaluated. The proposed a c t i o n  would preserve the  1989 
launch oppor tun i ty  f o r  t he  G a l i l e o  Mission and f u r t h e r  enhance NASA's 
a b i l i t y  t o  launch the  Ulysses Mission i n  1990, and would no t  compromise the 
science r e t u r n s  from e i t h e r  mission. I n  addi t ion,  the proposed a l t e r n a t i v e  
r e t a i n s  f o r  NASA the  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  launching e i t h e r  o r  both missions i n  
1991 us ing e i t h e r  the STS o r  the T i t a n  I V  launch vehic les.  
Delaying spacecraf t  mod i f i ca t i ons  u n t i l  t he  sa fe ty  and environmental 
analyses are complete would e l im ina te  the  1989 launch window f o r  Gal i leo.  
While the  1990 launch o f  Ulysses could be preserved, any add i t i ona l  delays 
i n  the  r e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  program could r e s u l t  i n  loss o f  the  1990 launch 
window. I n  t h a t  event, both missions could be launched i n  1991. Po ten t i a l  
science r e t u r n s  would remain i n t a c t  f o r  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and NASA would 
r e t a i n  the  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  launch Ulysses i n  1990 w i t h  the STS o r  both 
missions i n  1991 w i t h  e i t h e r  STS o r  t he  T i t a n  I V .  The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  delay 
o f  t h e  Ulysses Mission u n t i l  1991 would, however, have adverse economic and 
programmatic impacts. Sk i l l ed ,  experienced personnel could be l o s t  from the 
program. 
base would be a s i g n i f i c a n t  adverse impact t o  NASA's Solar  System 
Expl o r a t  i on Program and i t s  goal s . 
the  l o s s  of science re tu rns  from the  cancel led mission and a l o s s  o f  e i t h e r  
the $735 m i l l i o n  invested i n  G a l i l e o  o r  $135 m i l l i o n  invested i n  Ulysses 
(through FY 1987). Cancel la t ion o f  G a l i l e o  would a lso adversely impact the 
p o s i t i o n  of t he  Uni ted States as the wor ld leader i n  the  exp lo ra t i on  o f  the 
ou te r  planets, s ince the re  are c u r r e n t l y  no other  approved United States 
missions t o  the  ou te r  planets.  Cancel la t ion o f  Ulysses would adversely 
af fect  t he  Global Geospace Science i n i t i a t i v e  i n v o l v i n g  the Uni ted States, 
ESA and Japan and our perceived r e l i a b i l i t y  as a pa r tne r  i n  j o i n t  space 
expl o r a t  i on. 
The proposed a c t i o n  t o  
While the  s k i l l s  could be replaced, the l o s s  o f  the experience 
Cancel l ing one mission and cont inu ing w i t h  the  other  would r e s u l t  i n  
Cancel l ing both missions would r e s u l t  i n  the l o s s  o f  the t o t a l  $870 
m i l l i o n  investment i n  the two missions, and would adversely impact t h e  Solar 
System Explorat ion Program through the almost i r rep laceab le  l o s s  o f  the 
experience base represented by the 1 arge number o f  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers 
who would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e t a i n  w i t h i n  the program. 
geopol i t i c a l  consequences associated w i t h  the cancel 1 a t i o n  o f  the Ulysses 
The adverse 
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mission would arise from the perceived unreliability of the United States as 
a partner in joint space exploration. 
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3 .  AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 
b 
This  sec t i on  o f  t h i s  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) describes the  p r o j e c t  r e l a t e d  environments p o t e n t i a l l y  a f f e c t e d  by the 
proposed act ion.  
necessary frame-of-reference f o r  understanding the  discussions presented i n  
Sect ion 4 addressing "Environmental Consequences". 
The in format ion presented i n  t h i s  sec t i on  provides the 
3.1 LAUNCH AREA ENVIRONMENT 
The f o l l o w i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the l o c a l  and reg ional  Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) area summarizes in format ion contained i n  t h e  Nat ional  
Aeronautics and Space Admin is t ra t ion 's  (NASA's) Kennedy SDace Center 
Environmental Resources Document (Ref. 5), NASA's Kennedy Soace Center 
Environmental Imoact Sta tement (Ref. 6), and the  U.S. Department o f  Energy's 
(DOE'S) Kennedy SD ace Center DemoaraDhic and Land Use Study (Ref. 7). These 
th ree  documents form the  "basel ine ecology'' f o r  cons ider ing NASA's proposed 
a c t i o n  f o r  t he  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions. Add i t i ona l  i n fo rma t ion  on a l l  
aspects o f  the l o c a l  and reg ional  KSC area i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  these th ree  docu- 
ments. 
3.1.1 Local 
The KSC i s  located on the  east coast o f  F lor ida,  30 mi les  south o f  
Daytona Beach and 40 m i les  due east o f  Orlando, adjacent t o  the Cape 
Canaveral A i r  Force S t a t i o n  (see Figure 3-1). The KSC i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  Gu l f -  
A t l a n t i c  coastal  f l a t s  and occupies Cape Canaveral and the  n o r t h  end o f  
M e r r i t t  Is land. The KSC i s  approximately 35 mi les  i n  l eng th  and from 
5 t o  10 miles i n  width (see Figure 3-2). 
over approximately 6,507 of the  139,490 acres o f  the KSC. 
o f  t he  NASA operat ional  area i s  c u r r e n t l y  developed as f a c i l i t y  s i t es ,  
roads, lawns, and maintained r ight -of -ways (Ref. 5 ) .  
NASA maintains operat ional  con t ro l  
About 62 percent 
3.1.1.1 Land Use 
The KSC i s  NASA's primary i n s t a l l a t i o n  for launch operat ions and 
r e l a t e d  programs i n  support o f  both manned and unmanned space missions. The 
developed land  areas a t  KSC conta in  approximately 278 bu i l d ings ,  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
and support areas. Developed f a c i l i t i e s  w i t h i n  the  NASA operat ional  area 
are dominated by the S h u t t l e  Landing F a c i l i t y ,  t he  I n d u s t r i a l  Area, and the 
Vehic le Assembly B u i l d i n g  area. 
percent o f  t he  NASA operat ional  area. There are approximately 211 miles o f  
roadway a t  KSC wi th  163 mi les  o f  paved roads and 48 m i les  o f  unpaved roads 
(Ref. 5). 
These three areas comprise more than 70 
Normal operat ions a t  KSC include: spacecraft assembly and in teg ra t i on ;  
design, development, and operat ion o f  ground support equipment; t r a c k i n g  and 
data acqu is i t i on ;  launch operations f o r  the Shu t t l e  and expendable vehic les;  
recovery and refurbishment of the Shu t t l e  Sol i d  Rocket Boosters (SRBs); 
landing operat ions o f  the Shut t le ;  l o g i s t i c a l  support f o r  f l i g h t  operations; 
and design, construct ion,  and operat ion o f  launch f a c i l i t i e s .  
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FIGURE 3-1. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER/MERRIll ISLAND AND VICINITY 
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FIGURE 3-2. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER LOCATION MAP 
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The approximately 95 percent of  the KSC land a r e a  t ha t  i s  undeveloped 
c o n s i s t s  of wet lands,  uplands,  water cont ro l  a r eas ,  and mosquito cont ro l  
impoundments. 
ex t ens ive ly  catalogued,  and those  t ha t  a r e  l i s t e d  a s  r a r e  and endangered a r e  
c o n s t a n t l y  monitored. Also, NASA and the U.S. F i s h  and Wildlife Se rv ice  
have e s t a b l i s h e d  a wildlife preserve  on Merritt I s land ,  w i t h i n  KSC bound- 
a r i e s ,  f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  u n i q u e  and endangered species indigenous t o  the a rea .  
The U.S. F i s h  and Wildlife Serv ice  adminis te rs  a l l  75,383 ac res  of  the 
Merritt I s l and  National Wildlife Refuge and 50,945 a c r e s  of  the Canaveral 
Nat i onal Seashore.  The remai n i  ng 6,655 a c r e s  of  the Canaveral National 
Seashore a r e  adminis tered by the National Park Se rv ice  (Ref. 5 ) .  
The nearby land a r e a  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  KSC launches is  t h a t  ident i f ied 
a s  the estuary o f  the Banana River, Indian River, and Mosquito Lagoon 
(Ref. 8) .  
is  included i n  the above designated estuary a rea .  Merritt and o t h e r  b a r r i e r  
i s l a n d s  make up about 60 percent o f  these 460,000 ac res  and about 65 percent 
of  th i s  a r e a  i s  either water o r  nonagr icu l tura l  land. The remaining a r e a  i s  
used f o r  citrus product ion (about -3 percent), pas tu re  (about 0.3 percent), 
f o r e s t  land (about  12 percent), and miscel laneous a g r i c u l t u r e  (about  19 
percent). 
The  f l o r a  and fauna tha t  i n h a b i t  this a r e a  have been 
All o f  the on shore  a r e a  w i t h i n  20 ki lometers  of  the launch s i t e  
3.1.1.2 Climate 
The KSC c l i m a t e  is  s u b t r o p i c a l ,  w i t h  short ,  mild winters and hot ,  humid 
summers. The r a i n y  season (May t o  October) produces sou theas t  winds and 
d a i l y  thunderstorms,  while the dry season is  cha rac t e r i zed  by co ld  a i r  and 
l i g h t  r a i n s .  Wind d i r e c t i o n s  vary w i t h  seasonal meteorological  cond i t ions .  
Sea and land breezes p reva i l  i n  the summer and occur  occas iona l ly  i n  the 
sp r ing  and f a l l  (Ref. -5). In gene ra l ,  f a l l  winds occur  predominantly from 
the e a s t  t o  n o r t h e a s t  (Ref. 5) .  
Figure 3-3 presents the seasonal wind d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  lower atmosphere 
cond i t ions  a t  Cape Canaveral. 
3.1.1.3 On-si t e  Popul a t i  on 
The o n - s i t e  populat ion f o r  s p a c e c r a f t  launches may be considered a s  KSC 
employees and v i s i t o r s .  During a launch, approximately 6,000 employees and 
15,000 v i s i t o r s  may be o n - s i t e .  An add i t iona l  100 t o  110 thousand 
s p e c t a t o r s  a r e  o f t e n  found o f f - s i t e  during launches o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  pub1 ic  
interest. 
roads i n  the a rea .  
These ind iv idua l s  occupy nearby beach a reas  and l ine the pub l i c  
3.1.1.4 Socioeconomic Fac tors  
The KSC i s  loca ted  i n  Brevard County, which  ranks e i g h t h  i n  s i z e  and 
Brevard County has a populat ion density o f  
The KSC and the Air Force Eastern Space and 
This t o t a l  i s ' a l m o s t  one-fourth of the Brevard County work 
The balance o f  the County's employment i s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  tourism, 
n i n t h  i n  populat ion i n  F lor ida .  
239 persons per square mile. 
Missile Center currently employ approximately 16,000 people during the three 
shif ts  per day. 
fo rce .  
and support  s e r v i c e s  f o r  KSC and o t h e r  government programs. 
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FIGURE 3-3. SEASONAL WIND DIRECTIONS - LOWER ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS: 
CAPE CANAVERAL - MERRIIT ISLAND LAND MASS 
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T i t u s v i l l e  and the  City o f  
KSC i n d u s t r i a l  area. T i t u s v i l  
Cape Canavera? are the  c loses t  towns t o  the  
e has a populat ion o f  approximately 32,000 . .  
and i s  loca ted  9.5 mi les  from the  KSC. The City o f  Cape Canaverai has a 
populat ion o f  approximately 5,000 and i s  loca ted  8.5 mi les from the  KSC. 
The m a j o r i t y  o f  KSC workers l i v e  i n  these two towns, as we l l  as i n  Cocoa, 
Cocoa Beach, Melbourne, M e r r i t t  Is land, and Orlando. The launches o f  t he  
Space Transpor tat ion System (STS) s h u t t l e  have a t t r a c t e d  up t o  an add i t iona l  
100,000 t o  200,000 spectators from outs ide the  l o c a l  area f o r  launches o f  
spec ia l  i n t e r e s t .  Spectators normal ly gather i n  several KSC on -s i t e  areas, 
as we l l  as along Sta te  Route 1 near T i t u s v i l l e .  
3.1.2 R e d  onal 
The KSC reg iona l  area consis ts  o f  approximately 1,256 square mi les  (see 
F igure 3-1). 
3.1.2.1 Land Uses 
The KSC area encompasses 500 square mi les  o f  the  A t l a n t i c  Ocean. O f  
the  remaining 700 square mi les,  much of the  area cons is ts  o f  l a r g e  i n land  
bodies o f  water (e.g., Ind ian  River, Mosquito Lagoon, and the  Banana River,  
as we l l  as a number o f  ponds, lakes, and r i v e r s )  and wetland areas, The 
prominence o f  i n land  water bodies and wetland areas has r e s t r i c t e d  the  
development o f  r e s i d e n t i a l  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  lands t o  a l i m i t e d  p o r t i o n  o f  
t he  region. 
regions: 
i n  the  Cocoa/Rockledge and southern M e r r i t t  I s l and  area. 
o f  t he  KSC area cons is ts  o f  water, wetland, and undeveloped areas. 
Populat ion i n  the  reg ion  i s  concentrated l a r g e l y  i n  two 
along the  western shore o f  the  Ind ian  River,  and south o f  the  KSC 
The western p a r t  
3.1.2.2 Hydrology and Water Use 
I n  the  sandy b a r r i e r  i s lands  t h a t  make up much o f  t he  KSC, a l a r g e  p a r t  
o f  t h e  r a i n f a l l  soaks i n t o  the  ground and seeps downward t o  the  zone o f  
sa tu ra t i on  o f  t h e  non-artesian aqu i fe r .  
toward the  ocean o r  another waterway. 
Water i n  t h i s  zone moves l a t e r a l l y  
Surface water i s  p l e n t i f u l  i n  the  Cape area. The Ind ian  R iver  Basin i n  
the  area o f  M e r r i t t  I s l and  includes many sloughs and marshes. 
est imated t h a t  about 23 percent of the  land-associated surface area w i t h i n  
50 k i lometers west o f  the  Cape i s  covered by surface water. 
It i s  
Brevard County has product ive shrimp f i s h i n g  grounds. The pr imary 
species taken i s  the  wh i te  shrimp, a migratory  species t h a t  moves i n t o  and 
out o f  the  area. Sought commercially are f i s h ,  s h e l l f i s h ,  and o ther  
f i s h e r i e s  products. Typical  commercial f i s h  caught annual ly i n  Brevard 
County (Ref. 9) are shown i n  Table 3-1. 
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TABLE 3-1. ANNUAL COMMERCIAL MARINE AND ESTUARINE FISHEREY LANDINGS 
I N  BREVARD COUNTY 
TYDe Pounds 
To ta l  F i sh  ( p r i m a r i l y  spot, t i l e f i s h ,  b lack  2,988,460 
mul le t ,  groupers, menhadden, whi t ing,  
mackerel ) 
S h e l l f i s h  ( p r i m a r i l y  sca l lops and crabs) 10,527,671 
Shrimp 1,474,830 
3.1.2.3 Populat ion 
The populat ion i n  the reg ional  area nearby the KSC i s  approximately 
130,000. The populat ion may increase dur ing launches o f  special  i n t e r e s t  by 
more than 100,000 spectators, vary ing w i t h  the  t ime of day and year, and the 
weather (see Figure 3 - 4 ) .  A d e t a i l e d  analys is  o f  t he  geographical pat terns 
o f  populat ion residence and employment, as we l l  as major t ranspor ta t i on  
g r i d s  and pat terns,  are found i n  DOE'S Kennedy Soace Center DemowaDhic and 
Land Use Study (Ref. 7 ) .  
The nearest o f f - s i t e  populat ion i s  more than 10 k i lometers from the  
launch s i t e  and about 50 percent o f  the on-shore area w i t h i n  20 k i lometers 
o f  t he  launch s i t e  i s  water (Banana and Ind ian Rivers and Mosquito Lagoon). 
Appreciable numbers o f  o f f - s i t e  people are encountered 20 t o  40 k i lometers 
south and west o f  t he  launch s i t e .  
3.1.2.4 Add i t i ona l  Factors 
The climate and biotic resources of the region are essentially the same 
as those f o r  t he  l o c a l  KSC area. 
geology, and meteorology o f  t h i s  region, r e f e r  t o  NASA's Kennedv Soace 
Center D r a f t  Environmental Res ources Document (Ref. 5 ) ,  t he  Kennedy Soace 
Center Environmental Imoact Statement (Ref. 6), and the  F ina l  Safetv Analvsis 
ReDort f o r  t he  G a l i l e o  and Ulvsses Missions (Ref. 9) .  
For more in format ion on the geography, 
3 . 2  ABORT LANDING SITES 
NASA's STS contingency plans a1 low f o r  1 aunch-abort 1 andings a t  s i t e s  
both i n s i d e  and outs ide o f  the Uni ted States. Edwards A i r  Force Base, 
C a l i f o r n i a ,  White Sands, New Mexico, and the  KSC c u r r e n t l y  are designated by 
these plans as contingency landing s i t e s  w i t h i n  the con t inen ta l  Uni ted 
States f o r  t he  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions. 
s i t e s  are being reviewed by the U.S. State Department, and w i l l  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  and described as a p a r t  o f  NASA procedures t o  ob ta in  launch . 
approval. 
Prospective f o r e i g n  landing 
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FIGURE 3-4. TYPICAL IJUNCH DAY POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS NEAR KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
3-8 OF POOR QUALITY 
Edwards A i r  Force Base i s  located i n  Kern County, Cal i f o r n i a ,  100 mi les 
northeast o f  Los Angeles. 
acres and i s  s i t u a t e d  i n  a remote and sparsely populated area o f  t he  Mojave 
Desert. There are no lakes, r i v e r s ,  o r  streams i n  t h i s  area, and 90 percent 
o f  t he  r a i n f a l l  occurs between November and A p r i l .  
abundant (Ref. 10). 
STS S h u t t l e  missions r e t u r n i n g  f r o m  space. 
The land area o f  the base covers over 300,000 
Desert w i l d1  i f e  i s  
Edwards A i r  Force Base i s  the prime landing s i t e  f o r  
3.3 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
Worldwide data on meteorology, demography, and oceanography t h a t  are 
necessary f o r  analyzing launch and r e e n t r y  r i s k s  have been developed f o r  
DOE (Ref. 11). This  in format ion i s  contained i n  Volume 3 o f  the DOE Overal l  
Safety Manual and i s  used by NASA, DOE, and the Interagency Nuclear Safety 
Review Panel (INSRP) i n  t h e i r  var ious safety  analyses. These data, which 
use a number o f  na t i ona l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  government data sources, are 
c u r r e n t l y  being updated i n  order t o  broaden the  data base. 
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4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
The p r i n c i p a l  purpose o f  t h i s  F ina l  ( T i e r  1) Environmental Impact 
Statement ( E I S )  i s  t o  present in format ion t o  enable a choice among the  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  presented i n  Section 2. Th is  sect ion discusses the p o t e n t i a l  
environmental consequences t h a t  could r e s u l t  f r o m  the  implementation o f  each 
of t he  programmatic a l t e r n a t i v e s  ava i l ab le  t o  the  Nat ional  Aeronautics and 
Space Admin is t ra t ion (NASA) as presented i n  Section 2. Implementing any o f  
these choices has no near-term environmental impacts. The on ly  p o t e n t i a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  environmental consequences are associated w i t h  the completion 
and operat ion o f  t he  missions (i .e., t he  launch o r  inadver tent  reen t ry ) .  
Therefore, t he  present E I S  t r e a t s  the  launch imp l i ca t i ons  i n  a t  l e a s t  a 
p re l im ina ry  way, recogniz ing t h a t  a subsequent dec is ion on a launch o f  each 
mission i s  required. Those decis ions w i l l  be based on: 
0 Deta i l ed  analyses and a sa fe ty  v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  program 
documented i n  a F ina l  Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) f o r  each 
mission 
0 
Each launch dec is ion w i l l  be made i n  accordance w i t h  a P r e s i d e n t i a l l y  
mandated launch approval process. I n  accordance w i t h  i t s  own regulat ions,  
NASA w i l l  prepare add i t i ona l  updated environmental analyses f o r  t he  Gal i l e o  
and Ulysses missions which w i l l  have t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  d e t a i l e d  in format ion 
devel oped i n the  FSAR. 
An independent sa fe ty  evaluat ion documented i n  a Safety 
Evaluat ion Report (SER) prepared f o r  each mission. 
The pr imary environmental concern associated w i t h  the  G a l i l e o  and 
Ulysses missions i s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of environmental impacts associated w i t h  
p o t e n t i a l  major accidents i n v o l v i n g  launch o r  accidental  r e e n t r y  o f  t he  
spacecraft.  
The on ly  expected environmental consequences are associated w i t h  the 
normal launch o f  the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions. The environmental 
consequences of normal operations and normal 1 aunches were discussed i n  
d e t a i l  i n  the p rev ious l y  publ ished EISs on the Space S h u t t l e  Program (Ref. 
l o ) ,  t h e  Kennedy Space Center (KSC) (Ref. 6), and the KSC Environmental 
Resource Document (Ref. 5), and are summarized i n  Sect ion 4.5. 
It i s  important t o  note t h a t  adoption o f  t he  proposed a c t i o n  a t  t h i s  
t ime does no t  i r revocab ly  commit NASA t o  a f u t u r e  course o f  act ion.  
p a r t  i c u l  ar, t he re  w i  11 be a subsequent, separate deci  s ion  amonq a1 t e r n a t  ves 
I n  
t o  launch, delay, o r  cancel one o r  both o f ' t h e  missions based i n  safety,  
environmental, and programmatic considerat ions.  Furthermore, t he  
modi f icat ions t o  the spacecraft w i l l  no t  preclude a l a t e r  dec i s ion  t o  sw 
from the  Space Transportat ion System (STS)/ IUS c o n f i g u r a t i o n  t o  a T i t a n  
I V /  I US con f i gura t  i on. 
t c h  
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4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED ACTION TO CONTINUE WITH 
MODIFICATIONS OF THE SPACECRAFT TO USE THE I U S  WHILE COMPLETING THE 
FSAR AND ADDITIONAL NEPA RELATED DOCUMENTATION 
This sec t i on  discusses the consequences associated w i t h  the  proposed 
a c t i o n  o f  cont inu ing development o f  the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses missions ( i .e . ,  
cont inu ing w i t h  the  mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraf t  t o  
pursue the  op t i on  o f  an STS/IUS launch i n  1989 and 1990, r e s p e c t i v e l y )  wh i l e  
conducting t h e  d e t a i l e d  analyses o f  the safety  and environmental conse- 
quences o f  launch and missions execution. 
environmental impacts are associated w i t h  adopting the proposed act ion.  
No immediate o r  near-term 
Figure 4-1 shows the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the G a l i l e o  p r o j e c t  necessary t o  
enable a launch i n  October/November 1989. 
general categor ies:  
launch vehic le .  
grew ou t  o f  t he  t e s t i n g  program conducted i n  preparat ion f o r  t he  1986 
launch. These problems and t h e i r  r e s o l u t i o n  are unre lated t o  the  change i n  
mission, bu t  t he  launch delay presented an oppor tun i ty  t o  increase the  
r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t he  spacecraf t  systems (i.e., reduce the  r i s k  o f  t h e i r  
mal funct ion ing) .  
w i t h  preparat ion f o r  the VEEGA t r a j e c t o r y  (e.g., added thermal i n s u l a t i o n  
f o r  operat ion w i t h i n  1 AU). 
These a c t i v i t i e s  f a l l  i n t o  th ree  
problem reso lu t i on ,  new mission requirements, and 
Under problem r e s o l u t i o n  are a se r ies  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  
New mission requirements are those a c t i v i t i e s  associated 
These a c t i v i t i e s  themselves have no s i g n i f i c a n t  environmental impact. 
Further,  these a c t i v i t i e s  n e i t h e r  presuppose nor obv iate any o f  t he  a l te rna -  
t i v e s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  both the  continue and delay a l t e r n a t i v e s  conta in  
opt ions f o r  use o f  t he  IUS. 
There are no environmental consequences associated w i t h  cont inu ing the 
program development w h i l e  the  sa fe ty  analyses and add i t i ona l  NEPA r e l a t e d  
documentation. The major a c t i v i t i e s  t o  be conducted before the  add i t i ona l  
NEPA re1  ated documentation i s compl eted and i ssued i nvol ve making 
mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  t h e  G a l i l e o  spacecraft t o  accommodate the I U S  and adding 
thermal i n s u l a t i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  the G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  on i t s  path t o  J u p i t e r .  
Only minor mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the  Ulysses spacecraft w i l l  be necessary. F o r  
Gal i leo,  these a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  occur a t  the J e t  Propuls ion Laboratory (JPL) 
and w i l l  i nvo l ve  e x i s t i n g  employees, use e x i s t i n g  b u i l d i n g  space, and 
r e q u i r e  no s i g n i f i c a n t  addi t ions o f  mater ia ls .  No s i g n i f i c a n t  environmental 
impacts have been i d e n t i f i e d  as associated w i t h  these changes. None o f  the 
changes w i l l  preclude a l a t e r  dec is ion t o  switch from the  STS/IUS 
con f igu ra t i on  t o  launch veh ic le  a l t e r n a t i v e s  such as the  T i t a n  I V / I U S .  
4 .2  ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF SUSPENDING MODIFICATIONS UNTIL AFTER THE 
FSAR AND THE ADDITIONAL NEPA RELATED DOCUMENTATION ARE COMPLETE 
There i s  no environmental b e n e f i t  from suspending mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  the 
G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  because there are no adverse environmental impacts asso- 
c i a t e d  w i t h  those modi f icat ions.  
term and longer- term p o t e n t i a l  consequences o f  suspending mod i f i ca t i ons  t o  
the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses spacecraft u n t i l  a f t e r  the FSAR and add i t i ona l  NEPA 
r e l a t e d  documentation are completed. The near-term impacts are expected t o  
be p r i n c i p a l l y  s c i e n t i f i c ,  economic, programmatic, socioeconomic, and 
geopol i t  i c a l  . 
On the other  hand, there are both near- 
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The Galileo Mission was started in October 1977 and originally was 
scheduled for launch in 1982. 
NASA's Solar System Exploration Program for about 10 years. 
would have a significant negative impact on the science program. 
spacecraft, the recertification test program for the spacecraft starts in 
early 1989, and a delay of the recertification test until after the issue of 
the FSAR (September 1989) would rule out a 1990 launch. Currently, about 
500 people are working at JPL and elsewhere on the Galileo and Ulysses 
missions. If the modifications of the spacecraft were delayed a year or 
more until completion of the FSARs and the additional NEPA related 
documentation, there would be major programmatic impacts. Attempting to 
retain critically skilled personnel on a standby basis would be inordinately 
expensive. On the other hand, releasing such personnel and later attempting 
to hire replacements would undoubtedly lead to delays that would threaten 
the 1991 launch opportunity. 
skills, NASA would lose the experience base of the current staff. 
It has been the highest priority objective of 
A further delay 
Although no modifications per se are being carried out on the Ulysses 
Although NASA could eventually regain the 
mi n 
Per 
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Services requirements would also add expense to the mission. To 
mite system deterioration, the spacecraft would have to be serviced 
odically (e.g., to keep bearings and mechanisms operable). 
CONSEQUENCES OF CANCELLING ONE MISSION AND PROCEEDING WITH THE OTHER 
No near- term benef i ts would resul t from cancel 1 at i on because the 
proposed act i on i nvol ves no envi ronmental ri s k. However, the cancel 1 at i on 
of either the Galileo or Ulysses mission would result in a loss of the 
scientific benefits intended by the programs. Cancellation does avoid the 
possible radiological risks that may be associated with a launch. 
possible risks will be known and analyzed more fully in the FSAR and 
additional updated environmental analyses. The preceding alternatives will 
neither presuppose or obviate a later decision to cancel. 
the missions will not obligate the program to an exposure to such risks 
because the actual launches will be the subject of separate decisionmaking 
processes. 
Such 
Not cancelling 
4.3.1 Conseaue nces of Cancel 1 i na Gal i 1 eo 
There are no near- term environmental benefits of cancel 1 i ng the Gal i 1 eo 
mission, but there are major economic, programmatic, and geopolitical 
consequences of such a cancellation. Through FY 1987 (i.e., through 
September 30, 1987), NASA will have expended approximately $735 million on 
the Galileo program. Cancellation would mean the abandonment of that 
investment and a loss of the anticipated scientific gains. 
outer planets. Programmatically, there are currently no back-up missions 
that could achieve Galileo's scientific goals within this century, as 
there are no other approved U.S. missions to the outer planets. 
United States would forego detailed scientific knowledge of the unique 
environments of Jupiter. 
Currently, the United States has a clear lead in the exploration of the 
Thus, the 
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Galileo was started in 1977 and many scientists, engineers, and 
technicians have devoted a large share of their professional lives working 
on this project. From a human standpoint, it would be unfortunate to cancel 
the program when there is no clear evidence at this point of.adverse 
environmental impacts that would justify such a cancellation. 
4.3.2 Conseauences o f  Cancellina Ulvsseg 
There are no near-term environmental benefits associated with cancelling 
the Ulysses mission, but there are major economic, programmatic, and 
geopolitical consequences. Through FY 1987, NASA will have expended approx- 
imately $135 million on the Ulysses program. The European Space Agency 
(ESA) also will have spent at least that amount. That investment will be 
lost if the Ulysses program is cancelled. 
Programmat i call y , U1 ysses i s the on1 y approved, or even pl anned, 
mission to study the polar regions of the Sun. In addition, Ulysses will 
contribute significantly to the proposed Global Geospace Science (GGS) 
initiative involving the United States, the ESA, and Japan. If the U.S. 
participation in Ulysses is cancelled, the United States may appear as an 
unreliable partner for joint space exploration programs. 
4.4 CONSEQUENCES OF THE NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE - CANCELLING BOTH MISSIONS 
The cancellation of the Ulysses and Galileo missions would result in 
the loss of the scientific benefits intended by these missions. 
are essentially no risks involved in the proposed action, cancelling the 
missions will have no near-term benefits. However, cancellation does avoid 
the possible radiological risks that may be associated with a launch. 
cancelling the missions will not obligate the program to an exposure to such 
risks because the actual launches will be the subject of separate 
decisionmaking processes. 
Since there 
Not 
On the contrary, cancelling both missions will result in an additive 
combination of the adverse economic, programmatic, and geopolitical 
consequences of the cancellation of each mission separately. 
the United States would be abandoning an investment of $870 million. 
For instance, 
Further, since the Federal Republic of Germany is a partner in Galileo 
and the ESA is a partner in Ulysses, cancellation of both missions would 
critically threaten the ability of the United States to participate in 
international cooperative programs in the future. 
4.5 CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF IMPLICATIONS OF LAUNCH OF MISSIONS 
4.5.1 ImDl i cati ons of Normal Launches 
4.5.1.1 ' Imp1 i cat ions of Normal Launches of the STS/IUS 
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The p o t e n t i  a1 environmental impacts associated w i t h  the normal 1 aunch 
o f  the STS were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the prev ious ly  publ ished EISs on the  Space 
S h u t t l e  Program (Ref. l o ) ,  t he  KSC (Ref. 6), and the  KSC Environmental 
Resource Document (Ref. 5).  These p o t e n t i a l  environmental impacts (Ref. 10) 
are summarized bel  ow. 
TroDosDhere 
A ground c loud w i l l  be formed by the Space S h u t t l e  rockets du r ing  
launch. 
motors and l i q u i d  engines, t h e  products o f  a f te rbu rn ing  i n  the exhaust 
plume, the  a i r  t h a t  i s  mixed w i t h  the  exhaust gases, and much o f  t he  heat 
energy t h a t  i s  generated. 
concentrat ions o f  acids t h a t  can r a i n  on and a f f e c t  vegetation. 
This  c loud cons is t s  o f  the exhaust products from the s o l i d  rocket  
These gases have the  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  forming h igh 
The d i r e c t i o n ,  movement, and d i f f u s i o n  o f  the ground c loud have been 
the subject  o f  an i n t e n s i v e  a n a l y t i c a l  study t h a t  has been conducted dur ing 
the past several years. 
D i f f u s i o n  Model) has been developed t h a t  uses the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the 
rocket  exhaust products and launch s i t e  meteorology t o  p r e d i c t  t he  r i s e ,  
growth, and d ispersa l  o f  the ground cloud. To v a l i d a t e  the  model, seven 
T i t a n  launches were monitored a t  t he  KSC, using a i rcraf t -based,  ground- 
based, and sea-based inst rumentat ion t o  measure c loud concentrat ions and 
f a l l o u t  o f  hydrogen ch lor ide,  carbon dioxide, and aluminum oxide p a r t i c l e s .  
These chemicals are the  primary exhaust products o f  the s o l i d  rocke t  motors 
t h a t  are o f  concern. I n  a l l  cases, reasonable agreement e x i s t s  between 
measurements and the  model predic t ions.  
A mathematical model ( t he  Rocket Exhaust E f f l u e n t  
Theoret ica l  p r e d i c t i o n s  f o r  45 hypothet ica l  S h u t t l e  launch cases, s o l i d  
motors and l i q u i d  engin’es f i r i n g  simultaneously, provided concentrat ions o f  
hydrogen c h l o r i d e  t h a t  were below the recommended exposure l i m i t s .  
l a r g e s t  peak concentrat ion o f  hydrogen c h l o r i d e  ca l cu la ted  was 3.9 p a r t s  per 
m i l l i o n  (ppm), and the  highest average exposure l e v e l  over a 10-minute 
pe r iod  was 1.2 ppm. 
recommended by the  Nat ional  Academy o f  Sciences (NAS) i s  4 ppm f o r  a 
10-minute pe r iod  w i t h  a peak o f  8 ppm. 
The hydrogen c h l o r i d e  emit ted from the s o l i d  rocket  motors a lso can 
produce a c i d i c  r a i n  i f  the Space Shu t t l e  i s  launched du r ing  c e r t a i n  l o c a l  
meteorological  condi t ions.  I n  1967, Aero jet  General Corporation tes ted  a 
260-inch s o l i d  rocket  motor dur ing l o c a l  shower a c t i v i t y ,  which r e s u l t e d  i n  
damage t o  l ime  groves i n  the area. Ac id i c  r a i n f a l l  was measured f o r  the 
f i r s t  t ime dur ing the  T i t a n p i k i n g - B  launch i n  September 1975, and pH values 
ranging from 1 t o  2 were measured i n  areas c lose t o  the launch complex. The 
exhaust products contained i n  the ground cloud t y p i c a l l y  are dispersed 
w i t h i n  a 9-mi le zone around the launch s i t e .  
and 15,435 l b s  o f  p a r t i c u l a t e s  are deposited i n  the near f i e l d  environment, 
w i t h  the heaviest  deposi t ion usua l l y  occurr ing w i t h i n  0.6 m i l e  o f  the launch 
s i t e .  
p a r t i c u l a t e s  have been c o l l e c t e d  from the near f i e l d  zone (Ref. 5). 
The 
The human exposure l i m i t  f o r  hydrogen c h l o r i d e  
Up t o  6,615 l b s  o f  ch lo r i des  
Actual deposi t ion of up t o  100 g/m2 of  ch lor ides and 200 g/m2 of  
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Sonic Boon 
uninhabi ted ocean waters (Ref. 5 ) .  
occurs w i t h  ascent o f  t he  STS and generates a maximum overpressure o f  3.66 
pounds per  square f o o t  (ps f ) .  
l oca ted  about 40 mi les  o f f sho re  o f  t he  launch s i t e  i n  the  A t l a n t i c  Ocean. 
Atmospheric r e e n t r y  o f  t he  j e t t i s o n e d  SRB's generates the  second sonic boom 
wi th  maximum overpressures of 2 t o  3 ps f .  The foca l  tone o f  t h i s  boom i s  
l oca ted  150-200 mi les  down range. The t h i r d  sonic boom occurs w i t h  r e e n t r y  
o f  t he  j e t t i s o n e d  external  tank. The focal  zone i s  l oca ted  over the  Ind ian 
Ocean and has a maximum overpressure o f  2 t o  4 ps f .  
Launch o f  t h e  STS r e s u l t s  i n  th ree  s.onic booms w i t h  foca l  zones over 
The f i r s t ,  and l a r g e s t  sonic boom, 
The foca l  zone o f  t h i s  boom i s  t y p i c a l l y  
The O r b i t e r  a lso w i l l  produce a sonic boom dur ing  reen t ry .  Because o f  
t he  l a r g e  range o f  e n t r y  t r a j e c t o r i e s ,  t he  boom may occur p a r t i a l l y  over 
land. Overpressures have been ca lcu lated f o r  these condi t ions,  and 
t r a j e c t o r i e s  have been t a i l o r e d  t o  minimize the e f f e c t  on t h e  ground. 
Studies are being conducted i n  t h i s  area, and cu r ren t  est imates i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  maximum overpressures w i l l  be about 96 N per square meter ( 2  pounds per  
square f o o t )  i n  a small area w i t h i n  about 48 k i lometers (26 nau t i ca l  mi les)  
o f  t h e  landing s i t e .  
landings a t  KSC (Ref. 5). A maximum overpressure o f  2.2 p s f  was recorded 
from these landings a t  T i t u s v i l l e  about 10 mi les  from the S h u t t l e  Landing 
F a c i l i t y  a t  KSC. These overpressures are i n  the nuisance o r  annoyance range 
according t o  the  r e p o r t  issued by the Sonic Boom Panel o f  t he  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C i v i l  A v i a t i o n  Organizat ion i n  October 1970. 
Sonic boom measurements were recorded f o r  f o u r  
St ratoso here 
The Space S h u t t l e  exhaust releases water, hydrogen ch lor ide,  ch lor ine,  
and aluminum oxide p a r t i c l e s  i n t o  the stratosphere and produces n i t r i c  oxide 
i n  the  ho t  plume. The quan t i t y  o f  water released by the  Space S h u t t l e  i s  
small compared t o  na tu ra l  sources, and i t s  e f f e c t  on the  ozone dens i t y  w i l l  
be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  Model c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  t he  ef fects o f  aluminum oxide and 
n i t rogen  oxides have been made, and the  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  
these oxides a l so  are n e g l i g i b l e .  Chlor ine compounds i n  the  exhaust are the 
major source o f  STS impact on s t ra tospher i c  ozone. 
The p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t  o f  Space S h u t t l e  emissions on t h e  stratosphere was 
evaluated using the  pro jected Space Shu t t l e  launch rate,  p ro jec ted  t o  peak 
a t  a steady s t a t e  o f  60 f l i g h t s  per  year ( cu r ren t  p r o j e c t i o n s  are much 
lower).  This launch r a t e  was used i n  a one-dimensional model t o  p r e d i c t  
hemispher ica l ly  averaged c h l o r i n e  concentrat ions as a funct ion of a1 t i t u d e  
and time. 
From c a l c u l a t i o n s  made dur ing d i f f e r e n t  s tud ies conducted by s i x  
independent s c i e n t i f i c  groups i n  l a t e  1976, the maximum steady-state 
reduc t i on  o f  ozone was estimated t o  be 0.2 percent f o r  60 STS launches per 
year (Ref. 10). La te r  i n  1977, i t  was establ ished t h a t  the H2 + NO t o  OH + 
NO2 r e a c t i o n  r a t e  occurred much f a s t e r  than was p rev ious l y  supposed. This 
r e a c t i o n  r a t e  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  s t ra tospher ic  ozone chemistry, and a l a r g e r  
value leads t o  a l a r g e r  ozone reduct ion e f f e c t .  New c a l c u l a t i o n s  i n  1977 by 
f i v e  independent groups, using the same models but w i t h  the new r e a c t i o n  
rate,  i nd i ca ted  t h a t  t he  average ozone reduct ion i n  the Northern Hemisphere 
would be about 0.25 percent f o r  60 STS launches per year. This i s  s l i g h t l y  
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higher  than the previous value. 
undetectable compared t o  the  much l a r g e r  na tu ra l  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  s t ra tospher i c  
ozone leve ls ,  and should r e s u l t  i n  no l o n g - l a s t i n g  o r  permanent change f o r  
the stratosphere. 
This i s  considered i n s i g n i f i c a n t  and 
Ionomhere 
exhaust products from the  O r b i t a l  Maneuvering System (OMS) w i l l  reduce the 
i o n  concentrat ion.  This  e f f e c t  i s  l o c a l i z e d  and temporary. E f f e c t s  on 
r a d i o  wave propagation w i l l  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
During O r b i t e r  maneuvers above an a1 ti tude o f  180 k i  1 ometers, t he  
Dur ing O r b i t e r  reentry ,  which w i l l  occur between a 70- and 90-ki lometer 
a l t i t u d e ,  some o f  the heated atmosphere w i l l  be converted t o  n i t r i c  oxide, 
which i on i zes  i n  u l t r a v i o l e t  sunl ight .  The leng th  o f  t he  t r a i l  could extend 
t o  one-fourth the  circumference o f  the Earth, but  the w id th  w i l l  be narrow. 
The requ i red  t ime f o r  the t r a i l  t o  disappear has been ca l cu la ted  t o  be l ess  
than 1 day, and i f  wind shears are present, t he  t r a i l  could disappear i n  
hours. The e f f e c t s  o f  t he  ion ized t r a i l  on r a d i o  wave propagation are 
expected t o  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  The long-term e f f e c t s  o f  t he  n i t r i c  oxide on 
the stratosphere a lso have been studied and have been determined t o  be 
n e g l i g i b l e .  
Heal th and B i o l o a i c a l  E f f e c t s  
The impact o f  t he  Space Shu t t l e  on the  tropospher ic regions o f  the 
atmosphere w i l l  have no s i g n i f i c a n t  medical (human) o r  b i o l o g i c a l  ( p l a n t  and 
animal) e f f e c t s  outs ide the  KSC. 
and fauna has been developed t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between the  seasonal, 
c l i m a t i c ,  and o the r  changes (natura l  o r  manmade) occurr ing a t  t he  KSC launch 
s i t e .  
A basel ine ( o r  l i b r a r y )  o f  e x i s t i n g  f l o r a  
The launch-generated ground cloud has a measurable impact on the  near 
f i e l d  f l o r a  and fauna o f  t he  launch s i t e .  
events inc lude acute vegetat ive damage and f i s h  k i l l s  (Ref. 5 ) .  
has been documented from a 54-acre area outside o f  the per imeter o f  Launch 
Complex 39A (LC-39A). Described as w i t h i n  the near f i e l d  environment, t h i s  
t r a c t  has experienced s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  vegetat ive community s t r u c t u r e  
(Ref. 5 ) .  Vegetation surveys over n ine launch events ( A p r i l  1981 - November 
1983) documented a reduct ion i n  species r ichness accompanied by the 
e l i m i n a t i o n  f r o m  the  t r a c t  o f  s e n s i t i v e  species. Shrubs and small t r ees  
exposed t o  the  launch b l a s t  and associated ground cloud su f fe red  d e f o l i a t i o n  
and w i t h  t ime g radua l l y  were reduced o r  replaced by grasses, sedges, and 
weedy herbs. Overal l ,  t o t a l  vegetat ive cover i n  the near f i e l d  have been 
reduced and unvegetated areas have expanded. 
Near f i e l d  impacts from launch 
In format ion on the impacts o f  launch events t o  the l o c a l  environment 
The launch o f  STS-8 (August 1983) and STS-9 (November 1983) resu l ted  i n  
damage t o  the coastal  dune community. Impact analyses i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i n -  
l ea fed  herbaceous species, and shrubs w i t h  succulent leaves, are more 
s e n s i t i v e  t o  launch cloud deposi ts than are t y p i c a l  dune grasses (Ref. 5). 
Dune community species e x h i b i t i n g  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  launch cloud e f f e c t s  
inc lude camphorweed (Heterotheca s u b a x i l l a r i s ) ,  i nkbe r ry  (Scaevola 
4-8 
p l u m i e r i ) ,  beach sunflower (He1 ianthyS d e b i l  i s ) ,  and marsh e l d e r  (h 
imbr icatq) .  Dune species e x h i b i t i n g  res is tance t o  launch c loud e f f e c t s  
inc lude sea oats (Uniola Daniculatq), beach grass (Panicum amarum), and 
slender cordgrass (SDartina patens). 
f i s h  k i l l s  f o l l o w i n g  the launch o f  the space s h u t t l e  system (Ref. 5 ) .  
These waters can experience sharp depressions i n  pH as a r e s u l t  o f  launch 
c loud ra inou t .  Reductions i n  pH o f  4 u n i t s  w i t h i n  30 minutes o f  a launch 
event are possible. 
responsible f o r  t h e  f i s h  k i l l s  accompanying launch events. 
Shallow impounded waters i n  the v i c i n i t y  o f  LC-39A have experienced 
The sudden a c i d i f i c a t i o n  of surface waters i s  be l ieved t o  be 
1 -  
Species o f  f i s h  
c o l l e c t e d  from the  near f i e l d  impact area e x h i b i t  symptoms o f  severe i o n i c  
imbalance and anoxia, r e s u l t i n g  from extensive g i l l  damage (Ref. 5) .  
F ish k i l l s  have ranged from small ( l ess  than 100 i n d i v i d u a l s )  t o  major 
(greater  than 1,000 i n d i v i d u a l s ) .  To date, a t o t a l  o f  17 species have been 
recorded f r o m  the  near f i e l d  impact zone w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  specimens t y p i c a l l y  
l e s s  than 2 inches i n  length.  
those expected t o  occur i n  open water s a l t  marsh hab i ta t .  
The species recorded are f a i r l y  t y p i c a l  of 
While the impact on the  near f i e l d  f l o r a  and fauna i s  measurable 
f o l l o w i n g  each launch event, these impacts are l o c a l i z e d  and are not  l i k e l y  
t o  extend s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from the near f i e l d  environment. 
S h u t t l e  exhaust gases do con t r i bu te  t o  the  dep le t i on  of ozone i n  the  
stratosphere; however, such impacts occur over the ocean i n  a l i m i t e d  and 
small area. The na tu ra l  u l t r a v i o l e t  i r rad iances are h i g h l y  v a r i a b l e  and 
exceed the  Shut t le-predic ted ozone change by one order o f  magnitude. The 
responses and the r e p a i r  r a t e  o f  organisms t o  given doses and dose r a t e s  o f  
u l t r a v i o l e t  r a d i a t i o n  a lso are h i g h l y  var iab le.  
p r e d i c t i o n  o f  t he  e f f e c t  of such a small increase i n  u l t r a v i o l e t  r a d i a t i o n  
on s k i n  cancer h i g h l y  questionable. 
These factors  make any 
OccuDational FXDO sure Due t o  Normal I aunch 
Exposures o f  occupational personnel t o  minor external  r a d i a t i o n  would 
occur du r ing  t h e  t ranspor ta t i on  and handl ing o f  t he  Radioisotope 
Thermoelectr ic Generators (RTGs) before launch. 
monitored t o  ensure t h a t  the range i s  w i t h i n  acceptable l i m i t s ,  and the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n  procedures are c a r e f u l l y  designed so t h a t  t he  expected exposure 
l e v e l s  are as low as reasonably achievable. 
Exposure l e v e l s  are 
4.5.1.2 Imp1 i c a t  i ons o f  Del ayed Normal Launches 
For a launch o f  Ga l i l eo  and Ulysses t o  occur i n  the  next a v a i l a b l e  
delayed oppor tun i ty ,  1991, two launch conf igurat ions are p o t e n t i a l l y  
possible,  the STS/IUS discussed i n  the previous sect ion,  and a T i t a n  I V / I U S  
conf igurat ion.  The p o t e n t i a l  environmental impacts associated w i t h  normal 
launches o f  t he  STS/IUS were discussed i n  Section 4.5.1 and would no t  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  i f  the launches were delayed u n t i l  1991. 
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The environmental imp l i ca t i ons  o f  a normal launch o f  a T i t a n  I V / I U S  
have been addressed by the U.S. A i r  Force (Ref. 2 7 ) .  (The Complementary 
Expendable Launch Vehic le o r  T i t a n  3407 evaluated i n  Reference 27, has 
subsequently been renamed the T i t a n  I V . )  The impact evaluat ions f o r  the 
T i t a n  I V  (Ref. 27) were genera l l y  based upon scal ing-up from those addressed 
i n  an e a r l i e r  NEPA document prepared f o r  the T i t a n  I11 (Ref. 26) .  
Environmental impacts f o r  T i t a n  I V  launches are q u a l i t a t i v e l y  s i m i l a r  t o  
launch impacts o f  t he  STS, bu t  are expected t o  be q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t .  
The T i t a n  I V  S o l i d  Rocket Motors (SRMs), f o r  example, use approximately 60 
percent l e s s  s o l i d  rocket  p rope l l an t  than the  STS and hence produces a 
p ropor t i ona te l y  smal ler  exhaust cloud. The th rus t - to -we igh t  r a t i o  f o r  t he  
T i t a n  I V  v e h i c l e  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h igher  than t h a t  f o r  t he  STS. This  w i l l  
a l l ow  the  T i t a n  I V  v e h i c l e  t o  accelerate more q u i c k l y  and c l e a r  the  launch 
pad i n  l e s s  time, producing a smal ler  ground l e v e l  exhaust cloud. A t h i r d  
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between the T i t a n  I V  and the  STS i s  t he  type o f  
engines used du r ing  the  i n i t i a l  l i f t - o f f .  Un l i ke  the  STS, l i f t - o f f  o f  the 
T i t a n  I V  v e h i c l e  w i l l  be accomplished through use o f  on l y  the two SRMs. The 
1 i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  stages do no t  i g n i t e  u n t i l  approximately 115 seconds a f t e r  
l i f t - o f f .  One e f f e c t  o f  t he  f a s t e r  l i f t - o f f  coupled w i t h  the  l a c k  o f  l i q u i d  
engine exhaust f o r  the T i t a n  vehic les versus the  STS i s  t h a t  l e s s  HC1 from 
the  s o l i d  rocke t  motor exhaust w i l l  be scrubbed out  o f  t he  l o w  a l t i t u d e  
exhaust c loud t o  form HC1 mist .  
launch vehic le ,  as an a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  the  STS/IUS launch vehic le ,  w i l l  be 
addressed as needed i n  the add i t i ona l  environmental analyses t h a t  w i l l  be 
prepared p r i o r  t o  the  launch o f  each mission. 
Updated consequences f o r  t he  T i t a n  I V  
M i  no r  external  r a d i  a t  i o n  exposures o f  occupational personnel would 
occur du r ing  the  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and handl ing o f  the RTGs before launch. 
s i g n i f i c a n t  increase i n  occupational doses i s  a n t i c i p a t e d  between the 1986 
p r o j e c t i o n  and t h a t  expected f o r  a 1991 launch window. 
No 
4 .5 .2 .  Current Understandina o f  Po ten t i a l  Conseauences Associated w i t h  
Possible Accidents 
An analys is  o f  the impacts o f  poss ib le  accidents i n v o l v i n g  the  G a l i l e o  
and Ulysses spacecraf t  must consider the f o l l o w i n g  two c o n t r i b u t i n g  fac to rs :  
1) the response o f  the RT6 assembly and i t s  General Purpose Heat Source 
(GPHS) modules t o  p o t e n t i a l  accident environments, and 2)  t he  i n f l uence  o f  
var ious launch veh ic le  conf igurat ions on the  s e v e r i t y  o f  damage t h a t  may be 
done t o  the  RTG assembly as a r e s u l t  of explosions o r  impacts encountered i n  
an accident environment. 
subsections. 
These issues are addressed i n  the f o l l o w i n g  
4 . 5 . 2 . 1  RTG and GPHS Design and Performance H i s t o r y  
The GPHS, which i s  the source o f  energy f o r  the G a l i l e o  and Ulysses 
RTGs, i s  t he  cu lminat ion o f  almost 25 years o f  design evo lu t i on  o f  heat 
source technology. Safety i s  a p r i n c i p a l  engineering design goal o f  the 
heat source. 
immobil ize the f u e l  t o  the maximum extent  poss ib le  under normal and accident 
environments, and 2)  ensure c o m p a t i b i l i t y  w i t h  the power generat ion system. 
The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a summary (see Ref. 25) o f  safety  environments and GPHS 
response : 
The sa fe ty - re la ted  design goals are t o :  1) conta in  o r  
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L i q u i d  Propel lant  F i res.  
f i r e s  t h a t  can r e s u l t  from on-pad events. 
The GPHS modules surv ive the  most severe 
S o l i d  Propel lant  F i res.  
t he  burning sol  i d  propel 1 ant. 
The GPHS survives f i r e s  i n  contact  w i t h  
Explosions. 
pressures and clads were shown t o  surv ive pressures i n  excess o f  
2,000 p s i .  
Modules were shown t o  surv ive up t o  500 p s i  over- 
H igh -ve loc i t y  Fragments. Test data f o r  bare f u e l  c lads impacted 
by f l y e r  p l a t e s  representat ive o f  s t ruc tu res  invo lved i n  External 
Tank (ET) explosions (i .e., aluminum o f  thicknesses o f  approxi- 
mately 3.5 mm) were on ly  min imal ly  breached a t  v e l o c i t i e s  up t o  
1,170 m/s (3,838 f / s ) .  
Reentry. GPHS modules surv ive Earth-escape-veloci ty-reentry 
ab lat ion,  and thermal s t ress  wi th  wide margins. The very remote 
possi  b i  1 i t y  o f  an Earth f l y b y  v e l o c i t y  r e e n t r y  i s  c u r r e n t l y  under 
study. The r e s u l t s  o f  the nav igat ion study are presented i n  t h i s  
EIS.  The r e s u l t s  o f  the reen t ry  aerothermodynamic study w i l l  be 
presented i n  the  G a l i l e o  Mission € I S  ( T i e r  2). 
Earth Impact. GPHS modules were designed t o  surv ive impact on 
hard surfaces (grani  te/steel /concrete) a t  terminal  v e l o c i t y ;  
54 m/s (175 f /s ) .  
up t o  250 m/sec (appl icable t o  98 percent o f  t he  Earth's surface),  
no c l a d  f a i l u r e s  against  concrete a t  terminal  v e l o c i t y  (54 m/s), 
and small releases against  s tee l  o r  g r a n i t e  a t  terminal  v e l o c i t y .  
Even though clads alone showed small re lease when impacting a t  
terminal  v e l o c i t y  on a hard surface, when protected by the  
aeroshel l  and g raph i te  impact she l l ,  the normal conf igurat ion,  no 
re lease would be expected t o  occur. 
Test r e s u l t s  show no f a i l u r e s  o f  c lads against  sand 
Ocean Impact. GPHS modules surv ive water impact and w i l l  r e s i s t  
f u e l  re1  ease f o r  v i r t u a l  l y  unl  i m i  t e d  per iods.  
The design features f o r  t he  GPHS incorporate many s a f e t y - r e l a t e d  
considerat ions.  The f u e l  used i n  the GPHS design i s  plutonium 2'38 dioxide, 
h i g h - f i r e d  and hot-pressed i n t o  62.5 Watt capaci ty  ceramic f u e l  p e l l e t s .  
t h i s  form, plutonium 238 i s  v i r t u a l l y  i nso lub le  i n  ground o r  sea water 
should such exposure occur. 
I n  
The pr imary p r o t e c t i v e  ma te r ia l  used t o  encapsulate the  f u e l  i s  an 
a l l o y  o f  i r i d ium.  I r i d i u m  i s  a unique noble metal found i n  deposi ts o f  go ld 
and plat inum. It i s  compatible w i t h  the  f u e l  ma te r ia l  t o  over 1,5OO0C 
(2,7OO0F), r e s i s t s  ox ida t i on  i n  a i r  t o  l,OOO°C (1,8OO0F), and melts a t  
2,447OC (4,437OF). 
the hel ium generated by the f u e l  alpha p a r t i c l e  decay and t o  prevent the 
re1 ease o f  plutonium. 
Each c lad  a lso contains a frit vent designed t o  release 
The g r a p h i t i c  ma te r ia l s  i n  the GPHS perform several funct ions.  The 
primary f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  provide reen t ry  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  the fue led clads. 
This i s  t he  j o b  o f  t he  aeroshel l .  
p ro tec t i on .  This i s  accomplished by both the aeroshel l  and the  impact 
s h e l l .  The impact s h e l l  a lso serves as a redundant r e e n t r y  aeroshel l .  The 
A second major f u n c t i o n  i s  impact 
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t h i r d  funct ion i s  t o  provide a mounting s t r u c t u r e  f o r  t he  c lads t o  surv ive 
normal ground handl ing and launch dynamic loads. 
aeroshel l  and impact s h e l l  i s  c a l l e d  f i n e  weave, p ierced f a b r i c  (FWPF). 
FWPF i s  a carbon-carbon composite mater ia l  woven w i t h  h igh-st rength g raph i te  
f i be rs  i n  th ree  perpendicular d i rec t i ons .  Upon impregnation and 
g r a p h i t i z a t i o n ,  t he  ma te r ia l  has an extremely h igh thermal s t ress  res is tance 
as requ i red  f o r  r e e n t r y  p ro tec t i on .  
r e s u l t s  i n  un i form a b l a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  leading t o  h igh confidence i n  
a b l a t i o n  margins. 
m i s s i l e  nose cones, i s  one o f  t he  best a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e e n t r y  appl icat ions.  
The GPHS d e l i b e r a t e l y  was designed t o  be composed o f  small, modular 
u n i t s  so t h a t  r e e n t r y  heat ing and terminal  v e l o c i t y  would be lower than they 
were f o r  previous heat sources. A modular heat source tends t o  minimize the 
amount o f  f u e l  t h a t  can be postu la ted t o  be released i n  a given accident. 
For example, f o r  a h i g h - v e l o c i t y  fragment impact r e s u l t i n g  from a severe 
explosion t h a t  penetrates the  GPHS, a t  most a few o f  t he  fue led  clads would 
be expected t o  re lease f u e l .  
source designs. 
devel opment and sa fe ty  t e s t  programs. 
Overal l ,  t he  Department o f  Energy (DOE) has spent 9 years i n  
engineering, safety,  and environmental t e s t i n g  o f  the GPHS, b u i l d i n g  on the 
experience gained from previous heat source development programs. 
intended mission t h a t  included RTGs onboard the spacecraft.  E a r l y  RTG 
models c a r r i e d  r e l a t i v e l y  much smal ler  amounts o f  nuclear ma te r ia l  and were 
b u i l t  t o  burn up a t  h igh a l t i t u d e  dur ing accidental  reentry .  
requirement was met i n  1964 dur ing the  mal funct ion o f  t he  Navy's Tran- 
sit-SBN-3 nav igat ional  s a t e l l i t e  which c a r r i e d  the SNAP 9A RTG. There have 
been no known hea l th  e f f e c t s  from the loss o f  t h i s  s a t e l l i t e .  
The ma te r ia l  used f o r  the 
FWPF has a very f i n e  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  
This  mater ia l ,  used p r i m a r i l y  by the A i r  Force ' f o r  
This  i s  an improvement over e a r l i e r  heat 
Modular i ty  a lso s i m p l i f i e s  and reduces the  cos t  o f  t he  
There have been th ree  U.S. spacecraft t h a t  f a i l e d  t o  achieve t h e i r  
Th is  design 
Since 1964, RTG systems have been designed f o r  f u l l  f u e l  containment i n  
the  event o f  an accident. This design phi losophy has performed f l a w l e s s l y  
i n  two mission f a i l u r e s  where RTGs were present. 
i n t a c t  i n  t h e  Pac i f i c  Ocean i n  May 1968 a f t e r  a Nimbus B weather s a t e l l i t e  
f a i l e d  t o  reach o r b i t .  The f u e l  was recovered and used i n  a l a t e r  mission. 
I n  A p r i l  1970, t he  Apol lo  13 l u n a r  module reentered the  atmosphere and i t s  
SNAP 27 RTG, which was j e t t i s o n e d  p r i o r  t o  reentry ,  f e l l  i n t a c t  i n t o  the  
20,000 f e e t  deep Tonga Trench i n  the  P a c i f i c  Ocean, as planned f o r  i n  an 
aborted mission i n  such a s i t u a t i o n .  
A SNAP 19B2 RTG landed 
4.5.2.2. STS/IUS Conf igurat ion 
I n  the  wake o f  the Challenger accident, NASA cancel led development o f  
That rocket  was an energet ic l i q u i d  hydrogen/ l iquid oxygen 
the Centaur G-Prime f o r  f l i g h t  crew safety  reasons unre lated t o  nuclear 
launch safety.  
upper stage launch vehic le .  
s o l i d  fue led I U S  i n  the  Shu t t l e  f o r  launching deep space missions such as 
G a l i l e o  and Ulysses. 
S a t e l l i t e  i n  Earth O r b i t  dur ing the successful September 1988 STS Discovery 
f l  i g h t .  
I n  i t s  place, NASA proposes t o  use the 
An IUS successfu l ly  deployed a Tracking Data Relay 
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The STS/IUS conf igurat ion i s  expected t o  pose much l e s s  p o t e n t i a l  
environmental r i s k  than t h e  STS/Centaur, which was addressed i n  t h e  d r a f t  
E I S  o f  September 1985 (Ref. 1). 
i nd i ca ted  t h a t  most accident environments were dominated by Centaur invo lve-  
ment i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t he  i n i t i a t i n g  cause (e.g., a S o l i d  Rocket Booster 
(SRB) rup tu re  would generate h i g h - v e l o c i t y  fragments t h a t  would cause a 
Centaur rup tu re  and explosion).  
f u e l  i s  more i n e r t ,  i s  much l e s s  l i k e l y  than t h e  Centaur t o  explode and 
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  accident environments. 
The e a r l i e r  STS/Centaur sa fe ty  analys is  
The IUS, a s o l i d  fue led  upper stage whose 
It i s  noteworthy t h a t  an I U S  upper stage was on board du r ing  the  
Challenger accident i n  order t o  propel a data r e l a y  s a t e l l i t e  t o  geosyn- 
chonous o r b i t .  De ta i l ed  examination o f  photographic records, te lemetry  
data, and fragments recovered from t h e  Challenger accident have shown tha t :  
1) no major explosion occurred, r a t h e r  a rup tu re  o f  t he  external  p rope l l an t  
tank, i n i t i a t e d  by the  e f f e c t s  o f  t he  Shu t t l e  booster j o i n t  f a i l u r e ,  was 
fo l lowed by re lease and r a p i d  burn o f  some o f  t h e  l i q u i d  propel lants ;  2) the 
S h u t t l e  O r b i t e r  subsequently broke up under f l i g h t  dynamic and aerodynamic 
forces; and 3)  t h e  I U S  booster came ou t  o f  t he  cargo bay r e l a t i v e l y  i n t a c t ,  
broke up under aerodynamic forces, and f e l l  50,000 feet t o  the  ocean surface 
wi thout  v i o l e n t  so l  i d  p rope l l an t  i g n i t i o n .  Uncertain photographic evidence 
and an incomplete recovery of the Tracking and Data Relay S a t e l l i t e  d i d  not  
permi t  an assessment o f  i t s  response sequence. 
These f i n d i n g s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he  IUS d i d  no t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  the  accident 
Also, based on t h e  general design o f  t he  RTG, i t  i s  reasonable environment. 
t o  i n f e r  t h a t  had an RTG been on board the Challenger w i t h  an IUS, i t  would 
no t  have been damaged s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  the accident, and therefore,  i t  i s  
expected.that t h e r e  would have been no release o f  plutonium. 
Avai l  ab1 e I n f o  m a t  i on 
The d e t a i l e d  sa fe ty  analyses, environmental analyses, and the  safety  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  program are underway f o r  the STS/IUS conf igurat ion,  bu t  
are n o t  y e t  complete. S t i l l ,  the e x i s t i n g  data base from past analyses, 
performance data and f l i g h t  experience from e a r l i e r  missions, and e a r l y  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  analyses prov ide s u f f i c i e n t  in format ion t o  assess the 
adoption o f  t he  VEEGA t r a j e c t o r y  and t o  make p re l im ina ry  assessments o f  the 
consequences o f  accidents f o r  t he  STS/IUS case, and t o  assess the  
imp1 i c a t i o n s  o f  unavai lab le data. 
The kinds o f  in format ion a v a i l a b l e  are: 1) sa fe ty  and environmental 
analyses f o r  t h e  STS/Centaur, 2 )  rev i sed  estimates f o r  t he  most s i g n i f i c a n t  
accident scenarios f o r  the STS/IUS conf igurat ion,  3 )  r e s u l t s  o f  e a r l i e r  and 
cont inu ing t e s t s  o f  t he  response of t he  RTG t o  var ious accident 
environments, and, 4 )  pre l im ina ry  r e s u l t s  and assessments o f  ongoing safety  
and environmental analyses being conducted i n  preparat ion f o r  t he  launch 
approval review process and the add i t i ona l  updated EISs ( T i e r  2 ) .  These 
in format ion sources, inferences made from these sources, and t h e i r  
1 i m i t a t i o n s  are discussed below. 
The sa fe ty  and environmental analys is  processes are depicted i n  Figures 
4-2  and 4-3.  The analyses cons is t  o f  d e f i n i n g  p o t e n t i a l  accident scenarios 
and r e s u l t i n g  environments t o  which the RTGs/Radioisotope Heater Un i t s  
(RHUS) may be exposed and the p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  these acc idents .  
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and environments, and then assessing the consequences o f  subject ing the  
RTGs/RHUs t o  those environments. The r i s k  i s  then a combination o f  t he  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  the accidents and t h e i r  consequences. 
i s  a S h u t t l e  Data Book (Ref. 28) t h a t  contains scenarios and environments 
f o r  t he  STS/IUS conf igurat ion.  
A t  t h i s .  time, the re  
A number o f  documents were developed f o r  t he  planned 1986 launch o f  
G a l i l e o  and Ulysses using the  STS/Centaur. Among these documents were: the 
FSAR (Refs. 12, 13, and 9); a d r a f t  SER (Ref. 14) prepared by the  
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel ( INSRP) bu t  never fo rma l l y  completed 
due t o  c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  t he  STS/Centaur; and the  "Assessment o f  t he  Safety 
Documentation f o r  t h e  G a l i l e o  and Ulysses Mission" prepared by the  DOE 
O f f i c e  o f  Nuclear Safety (Ref. 15).  
Dur ing the  i n t e r v a l  between the completion o f  the FSAR ( l a t e  1985) and 
the present, work has been red i rec ted  t o  develop and t o  improve and r e f i n e  
the accident models and techniques f o r  analyses appl icable t o  the  STS/IUS 
case as fo l lows.  
L i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  explosion modeling f o r  ET accidents has been 
completely redone. The STS/IUS l i q u i d  p rope l l an t  explosions i nvo l ve  s p i l l  
modes onto the  launch pad from the  ET o r  i n - f l i g h t  vapor c loud explosions. 
Data have been reevaluated and recent cryogenic mix ing data al lowed 
est imat ion o f  reactant  dens i t y  and improved estimates o f  explosion 
parameters a t  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  the RTGs f o r  t he  accident scenarios. 
CPHS sa fe ty  t e s t i n g  i s  cont inuing, and add i t i ona l  t-est data t h a t  w i l l  
be used i n  the  STS/IUS FSAR are being obtained. 
An atmospheric d ispers ion model t h a t  i s  able t o  use m u l t i p l e  sequences 
o f  r e a l  t ime vary ing three-dimensional meteorological  data, and having a sea 
breeze modeling capabi l  i ty, has been adapted f o r  FSAR use (Ref. 16). 
While the  1985 FSAR represented a s i g n i f i c a n t  increase i n  the  
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  o f  accident modeling over t h a t  appl ied f o r  previous RTG 
missions, t he  a c t i v i t i e s  described i n  the  preceding paragraphs since the  
1985 FSAR w i l l  permi t  a b e t t e r  assessment o f  mission r i s k s .  
A new FSAR and SER w i l l  be requi red f o r  the STS/IUS because the 
analys is  o f  December 1985 i s  no t  appl icable t o  t he  present case. I n  the 
e a r l  i e r  analyses, the accident scenarios w i t h  appreci ab1 e re1 ease o f  f u e l  
a l l  assumed t h a t  t he  Centaur explosive b l a s t  was h igh enough i n  overpressure 
and impulse t o  s t r i p  away the aeroshel l  and h u r l  i r i d i u m  encased fue led 
clads against  the Shu t t l e  bay forward bulkhead. With replacement o f  the 
1 i q u i d - f u e l e d  Centaur w i t h  the sol  i d - f u e l e d  IUS, these accident scenarios no 
longer  apply. Therefore, most o f  t he  accident analyses and the  r e s u l t s  o f  
the e a r l i e r  STS/Centaur FSAR are not re levan t  t o  the STS/IUS conf igurat ion.  
STS/IUS Conf iaurat ion Assessment 
The STS/IUS (and STS/IUS/PAM-S) w i l l  present much more benign accident 
environments than d i d  the STS/Centaur. The I U S  i s  much l e s s  l i k e l y  than the 
Centaur t o  con t r i bu te  t o  accidents i n i t i a t e d  elsewhere. 
December 1985 FSAR assumed t h a t  an ET explosion would lead t o  fragments t h a t  
would t r i g g e r  a Centaur explosion. 
F o r  instance, the 
This was assumed t o  lead t o  l a r g e  
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overpressures and impulses a t  the  l o c a t i o n  o f  the  RTGs. 
accident demonstrated, t he  IUS would n o t  con t r i bu te  t o  t h e  accident 
environment i n i t i a t e d  by ET f a i l u r e  i n  f l i g h t .  
resu l ted  i n  a vapor c loud burning o f  t he  hydrogen p rope l l an t  lead ing  t o  
modest overpressure and impulse. 
As the  Challenger 
Furthermore, t he  ET f a i l u r e  
Nevertheless, there  are s t i l l  accident environments t h a t  could threaten 
t h e  RTGs i n  t h e  STS/IUS cases. I n  general, the  k inds o f  environments 
analyzed t o  date are b l a s t  overpressures and h igh-ve loc i  t y  motor casing 
fragments. Based on the  RTG safe ty  v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  data (see Ref. 25) ,  no 
environments have been i d e n t i f i e d  which i n d i c a t e  overpressures a t  t h e  
l o c a t i o n  o f  t he  RTGs t h a t  could cause a re lease o f  RTG f u e l  mater ia l .  
M i t i a a t i n a  Measures 
For t h e  STS/IUS conf igura t ion ,  two types o f  m i t i g a t i n g  measures can be 
considered: add i t i ona l  p r o t e c t i v e  sh ie lds  o r  conta iners t o  p r o t e c t  t he  RTGs 
i n  accidents, and radiol.ogica1 contingency p lanning t o  m i t i g a t e  t h e  
consequences i f  an accident occurred. 
The nuc lear  ma te r ia l  i s  sh ie lded i n  t h e  cu r ren t  design o f  t h e  GPHS/RTG 
and sa fe ty  v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  data show the  design can wi thstand and success- 
f u l l y  con ta in  f u e l  over a broad range o f  p o t e n t i a l l y  h o s t i l e  circumstances 
(e.g., reen t ry  ab la t ion ,  overpressure, etc.) .  Nevertheless, i n  the  wake o f  
t he  Challenger accident, NASA conducted a design study o f  an add i t i ona l ,  
f u l l - e n c l o s u r e  s h i e l d  (Ref. 18). A f t e r  cance l l a t i on  o f  t he  Shuttle-Centaur, 
t h i s  study was cont inued f o r  t h e  STS/IUS conf igura t ion .  For t h i s  l a t t e r  
case, t he  study considered the  pr imary t h r e a t  t o  be from h igh -ve loc i t y  f rag -  
ments due to, f o r  instance, an SRB rup ture  dur ing  the  ascent phase. 
An add i t i ona l  f u l l  -enclosure s h i e l d  could prov ide add i t i ona l  p ro tec t i on  
from fragments. However, a f u l l  enclosure s h i e l d  could compromise the  
fundamental design o f  t he  GPHS/RTG by adding considerable weight and 
reducing drag. Thus, i n  an inadver tent  reentry ,  t he  s h i e l d  would lead t o  an 
increased b a l l  i s t i c  coe f f i c ien t ,  h igher  terminal  v e l o c i t y ,  hard landing, and a 
potential large local release of  fuel. Therefore, since the addit ional  
sh ie ld ing  would add minimal protect ion,  but  would add r i s k  i n  the  event of 
reentry ,  NASA has decided t o  mainta in  the  basel ine GPHS/RTG con f igu ra t i on  
w i t h  no f u l l  enclosure sh ie ld .  
For missions i n v o l v i n g  space nuc lear  power, comprehensive r a d i o l o g i c a l  
contingency p l  ans must be developed t o  address a1 1 1 aunch/l anding phase 
accidents i n v o l v i n g  the  RTGs and RHUS. These plans are developed through 
the  combined e f f o r t s  o f  var ious government agencies, i nc lud ing  NASA, DOE, 
the  Department of Defense (DOD), t he  Environmental Pro tec t ion  Agency (EPA) , 
and the  Sta te  o f  F lo r ida ,  and are formulated t o  conform t o  the  federa l  
Radio log ica l  Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) (Ref. 23). These plans W"il1 be 
updated f o r  t h e  Ga l i l eo  and Ulysses missions based on the  r e s u l t s  o f  the  new 
FSAR and SER. Development and implementation o f  these plans w i l l  ensure the 
avai 1 abi  1 i t y  o f  appropr i  a te  response personnel , equipment, f a c i  1 i t  ies,  and 
procedures i n  t h e  event o f  a launch accident.  
The pr imary ob jec t ives  dur ing the  e a r l y  phases of an accident are t o  
determine whether a release o f  rad ioac t i ve  mater ia ls  has occurred, t o  assess 
4-17 
and charac ter ize  t h e  ex ten t  o f  t he  release, t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  propagat ion o f  
the  released mater ia l ,  and t o  formulate/recommend m i t i g a t i n g  ac t ions  t o  
safeguard humans and the  environment from the  consequences o f  t h e  release. 
These ob jec t ives  w i l l  be achieved through the  eva lua t ion  and analys is  o f  
rea l - t ime  data provided by mobile f i e l d  moni tor ing teams and ground a i r -  
sampling s ta t ions ,  a i rborne moni tor ing and su rve i l l ance  a i r c r a f t ,  ground and 
a i rborne meteorological  s ta t ions ,  and computerized d ispers ion  modeling. 
Follow-on ob jec t i ves  would be t o  i s o l a t e  contaminated areas, recover 
the  f u e l  mater ia ls ,  and decontaminate and/or recover a f fec ted  areas, 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  equipment, and proper t ies .  
~ 4.5.2.3 VEEGA T ra jec to ry  Imp1 i c a t  i ons 
Use o f  t h e  STS/IUS w i l l  r e q u i r e  the  Ga l i l eo  spacecraf t  t o  execute one 
Venus and two Ear th f l y b y  g r a v i t y  ass i s t s  (VEEGA t r a j e c t o r y )  t o  ga in  
s u f f i c i e n t  k i n e t i c  energy t o  ge t  t o  Jup i te r .  Dur ing the  second Ear th f l yby ,  
t he  spacecraf t  w i l l  t r a v e l  a t  14.2 km/s and i t s  c loses t  approach may be 
some 300 km i n  a l t i t u d e  above the  surface o f  the  Earth. 
Over the  l a s t  year, JPL, which developed the  Ga l i l eo  Mission, has 
conducted an extens ive study t o  i d e n t i f y  and determine the  1 i ke l  i hood o f  
mission accidents o r  f a i l u r e s  t h a t  could cause the  G a l i l e o  spacecra f t  t o  
impact t he  Ear th du r ing  one o f  the  spacecraf t 's  two Ear th f l ybys .  As a 
r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  study (Ref. 29),  a spacecraf t  design m o d i f i c a t i o n  was made t o  
decrease the  probab i l  i t y  o f  a spacecraf t  f a i l u r e  lead ing  t o  Earth-impact. 
With the  implementation o f  t h i s  modi f icat ion,  t he  study dete ined the  
o v e r a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an Earth-impact accident t o  be 5 x 10 'pp . 
This  r e s u l t ,  wh i l e  considered conservative, does n o t  address t h e  issue 
o f  whether o r  no t  o r  t o  what extent  a release o f  Plutonium-238 can occur i n  
the  event o f  an Ear th reen t ry  accident; t h i s  issue w i l l  be addressed i n  the  
F ina l  Safety Analys is  Report (FSAR) f o r  the  Gal i l e o  Mission and the  Gal i l e o  
Mission E I S  ( T i e r  2). 
There are th ree  types o f  mission accidents o r  f a i l u r e s  which could lead 
t o  inadver ten t  reen t ry  dur ing  a VEEGA f lyby.  
d ispersions, (2) spacecraf t  f a i l u r e s ,  and (3) ground operat ions e r ro rs .  For 
each o f  these, a range o f  events were def ined and analyzed t o  q u a n t i f y  the  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  each t o  the  ove ra l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  Earth-impact and t o  
assess spacecraf t  and/or mission design changes t h a t  could lower the  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an Ear th reen t ry  accident. 
i n  the  f o l l o w i n g  subsections. 
They are: (1) nav iga t ion  
The study r e s u l t s  are summarized 
Naviaat ion E r ro rs  
I .  
A l l  G a l i l e o  spacecraf t  maneuvers w i l l  be designed subject  t o  the  
cons t ra in t  t h a t  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of the spacecraf t  ending up on an Earth- 
impacting tr j e c t o r y  (as a r e s u l t  o f  the  maneuver) w i l l  be l e s s  than o r  
equal t o  lo-'. This i s  accomplished by b ias ing  the  spacecraf t 's  aimpoint 
away from the  Earth. 
spacecraf t  would f l y  by the  Earth on any given t r a j e c t o r y  i f  i t  were allowed 
t o  cont inue from t h a t  p o i n t  w i t h  no f u r t h e r  maneuvers.) 
(The "aimpoint" i s  the  l o c a t i o n  a t  which the  
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In assessing this strategy, JPL has determined that navigation 
dispersion errors do not effect the capability to perform a recovery 
accounted for in the analysis, the probability of Earth-impact due 
navigation dispersions has been determined conservatively to be 
each of the two Earth flybys. 
. maneuver from an Earth-impacting trajectory. When this capabi 1 i ty is 
on 
Soacecraft Fai 1 ures 
JPL has evaluated many types of failure modes that might have the 
potential to place the Gal ileo spacecraft on an Earth-impacting trajectory 
during either of the two Earth-flybys. 
estimates for these failure modes. Only three have been determined to 
represent even a remote threat of Earth-impact. Of these three, concerns 
about Retro-Propulsion Module Overpressure Conditions have already led to 
the implementation of a spacecraft design change (see below). 
Table 4-1 summarizes the probability 
0 Retro -Prowl si on Modul e Penetr ation BY a Micrometeoroid - The 
probability o f  this fai ure mode occurring and leading to 
Earth-impact is 4 x lo-’. The sequence of events required to lead 
to Earth-impact is as follows: 1) a micrometeoroid (of sufficient 
size and velocity) penetrates the protective layers of the 
existing micrometeoroid shield with sufficient energy to cause a 
tank to rupture; 2) the rupture of the tank alters the velocity o f  
the spacecraft in the direction and with the magnitude necessary 
to place the spacecraft on an Earth-impacting trajectory; and 3) 
all attempts to recover the spacecraft from this trajectory fail. 
0 Thrusters Stuck Ooen o r Shut - The probability of thig failure 
mode occurring and leading to Earth-impact is 6 x 10- . 
sequence of events required to lead to Earth-impact is as follows: 
1) an electronics failure causes one or more of the spacecraft’s 
propulsion thrusters to stick after a maneuver has been completed; 
2) during the next maneuver an unexpected change in velocity 
occurs which a1 ters the spacecraft’s trajectory differently than 
intended; 3) this trajectory is one that will lead to Earth- 
impact; and 4) recovery attempts f a i l . .  
The 
This type o f  failure would only result in small perturbations in 
the spacecraft’s trajectory because there are valves upstream of 
the thrusters in the propellant lines that will be commanded 
closed either by automatic spacecraft fault protection software or 
by command at the end of the maneuver. Moreover, there are two 
independent thruster systems which provide the capability, in the 
event of a failure, to shut down one system and accomplish the 
required maneuver with the second system. 
probabilit estimate for this failure mode leading to Earth-impact 
from having modified the pressure relief valve system on the 
spacecraft’s propellant tanks to avoid the possibility of a 
propellant tank rupture. 
failure mode to lead to Earth-impact is as follows: 
two independent failures occur which lead to the inability to 
0 Retro-ProDulsion Module IRPM) Overoressure Conditions - The 
is 3 x 10‘ 4 . The low probability for this failure mode results 
The sequence of events required for this 
1) at least 
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T E C-1: BAB R L F V  
SPACECRAFT/MISSI 
TY ARTH - 
IDENJ 
MPACT BY 
FAILURE MODE 
F a i l u r e  Mode 
Probabi 1 i t y  o f  Fa i l  ure 
Occurring t h a t  P laces  
Spacecraf t  on an Earth 
Reentry Tra j ec to ry  and 
No Recovery can be Made 
Spacec ra f t  F a i l u r e s  Due t o  
Micrometeoroid Impact 
Thrusters Stuck Open 
o r  S h u t  
Retro-Propul s ion  Module 
Overpressure Conditions 
Other Fai 1 ures 
Ground Operation Er ro r s  
4 x 10-7 
6 x 
Total  Probabi 1 i t y  5 x 10-7 
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command and c o n t r o l  t he  spacecraft;  2) as a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s ,  the 
spacecraf t 's  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  the sun changes such t h a t  t he  
p r o p e l l a n t  tanks are heated causing a r i s e  i n  pressure i n s i d e  the 
tanks; 3)  the pressure r e l i e f  valve system on one tank f a i l s ;  
4) t he  pressure increase leads t o  a tank rupture;  and 5) t he  
t r a j e c t o r y  change r e s u l t i n g  from the  rup tu re  i s  one t h a t  leads t o  
Earth-impact r a t h e r  than the more l i k e l y  outcome o f  moving the 
spacecraf t  even f a r t h e r  away from Earth. 
a g the  r Fai 1 u r e  Modes - S ix  add i t i ona l  spacecraf t  f a i l u r e  modes 
have been determined t o  represent a remote t h r e a t  o f  p l a c i n g  
the  spacecraf t  on an Earth-impacting t r a j e c t o r y  w i t h  no chance o f  
recovery: Command Data Subsystem (CDS) o r  A t t i t u d e  and 
A r t i c u l a t i o n  Control Subsystem (AACS) Software Errors;  AACS/CDS 
Memory Chip Fa i l u re ;  Up1 ink Command Errors;  Spacecraft 
S t r u c t u r a l  Fa i lures;  Radiat ion, Cosmic Ray, and Single Event 
Upset Ef fects ;  and Spacecraft Charging Due t o  t h e  Near Ear th 
Environment. None o f  these f a i l u r e  modes are associated w i t h  a 
c r e d i b l e  se r ies  o f  events t h a t  would r e s u l t  i n  Earth-impact. 
Ground Ooerations E r  r o r s  
The t o t a l  p r o b a b i l ' t y  o f  t h i s  f a i l u r e  mode occurr ing and lead ing  t o  
impact i s  as fo l lows:  1) an e r r o r  i s  made i n  prepar ing a command sequence 
f o r  t he  spacecraft;  2) t he  e r r o r  i s  n o t  detected du r ing  the  command sequence 
approval process and i s  t ransmi t ted t o  t h e  spacecraft;  3)  t h e  e r r o r  causes 
an anomalous t h r u s t e r  f i . r ing;  4) as a r e s u l t ,  the spacecraf t  t r a j e c t o r y  
changes; 5) t h i s  t r a j e c t o r y  i s  one t h a t  w i l l  lead t o  Earth-impact; and 6) . 
recovery attempts f a i l .  
Earth-impact i s  1 x 10' 3 . The sequence o f  events requ i red  t o  lead t o  Earth- 
I n  t h e  remote circumstance t h a t  events 1 t o  5 d i d  occur, t he  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  recovery from t h i s  f a i l u r e  mode i s  h igh because i t  does no t  
i nvol  ve any spacecraf t  f a i  1 ure. 
I m o l i c a t i o n  o f  VEEGA Tra-iectorv Earth-imDact P robabi  1 i t  i es  
While these estimates are considered conservat ive estimates o f  t he  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  Earth-impact, they do no t  address the  issue o f  whether o r  not  
o r  t o  what extent  a release o f  Plutonium-238 can occur i n  t h e  event o f  Earth 
reentry ;  t h i s  issue w i l l  be addressed i n  the G a l i l e o  Mission E I S  ( T i e r  2 ) .  
by GE i nd i ca tes  t h a t  t he  RTG heat source modules o r  g raph i te  impact s h e l l s  
would su rv i ve  reen t r i es .  For a small band o f  shallow angles (between 0 
degrees and about -5  degrees), the modules w i l l  escape the Earth e n t i r e l y .  
Under some r e e n t r y  condi t ions the aeroshel l  has been p red ic ted  t o  f a i l ,  
r e leas ing  the  impact s h e l l s  conta in ing the  fue led  clads. I n  some cases the 
i r i d i u m  clads are predic ted t o  melt .  Almost a l l  impacts would be on water, 
s o i l ,  o r  sand f o r  which there i s  a h igh p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  conta in ing the f u e l .  
A small percent o f  the impacts would i nvo l ve  a hard surface, and hence a 
l o c a l i z e d  re lease o f  f u e l .  A comprehensive t e s t  and analys is  program t o  
produce an updated p r e d i c t i o n  o f  the module performance i n  a VEEGA r e e n t r y  
S t i l l ,  i n  the  remote instance o f  reentry ,  p re l im ina ry  analys is  
, 
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produce an updated prediction of the module performance in a VEEGA reentry 
has been initiated by DOE. 
4.5.2.4 Delay Alternative Launch Configurations 
With a delay, launch of Galileo could take place with the STS/IUS or 
with the Titan IV/IUS configuration. 
the proposed action or a delayed launch in terms of potential STS/IUS 
accident considerations. This section addresses comparisons o f  accident 
considerations between the STS/IUS and the Titan IV alternatives. 
discussion generally will apply to both Galileo and Ulysses except for the 
VEEGA reentry scenario, which appl ies only to Gal ileo. 
There would be no difference between 
The 
In an overall sense, the SRBs, which all available systems (STS and 
Titan IV) use, by experience have a higher empirical probability of an 
accident than the liquid propellant systems. In view of the extensive 
redesign and testing program in the wake of the Challenger accident, it is 
reasonable to presume that the SRBs to be used in the STS will be more 
re1 i ab1 e than those previously used. 
Avai 1 ab1 e Informat i on 
The detailed definition of the Titan IV accident environments will be 
complete prior to the preparation of the Tier 2 EIS for the Galileo mission. 
These detailed environments will be used as an input to the analysis that 
will evaluate the risks associated with the mission if the Titan IV is used 
as the launch vehicle. 
The preliminary information being analyzed from the Titan 34 D-7 .acci- 
dent is relevant to consideration of Titan IV accidents. 
The RTG test information described in Section 4.1.2 is applicable to a 
Titan IV configuration and will be used in evaluating the response of RTGs 
to Titan IV accidents. 
The approach taken in this assessment is to identify design features of 
the Titan IV/IUS configuration that are relevant in identifying differences 
between Titan IV/IUS and STS/IUS accident scenarios and to discuss their 
imp1 ications on RTG fuel releases. 
The vertical stack of a Titan IV vehicle with the spacecraft and RTGs 
at the top of the stack, as shown in Figure 2-13, moves the RTGs farther 
away from 1 iquid propellant tanks and potential 1 iquid propellant centers o f  
explosion than is the case with the STS/IUS with reference to the STS ET. 
The Titan IV liquid fuel (Aerozine-50 and nitrogen tetroxide oxydizer) has a 
lower energy density than the liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen fuel and 
oxydizer o f  the STS. Therefore, any explosion of the Titan IV liquid 
propellants would be expected to be less severe on an RTG than an explosion 
o f  Shuttle ET liquid propellants. 
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The t h r e a t  o f  SRB casing fragments i s  a lso small because the  SRBs are 
Observations o f  high-speed f i l m s  o f  t he  T i t a n  w e l l  removed from the  RTGs. 
I V  explosion o f  one SRB and the des t ruc t  o f  the other  c l e a r l y  showed t h a t  
SRB fragments would miss the RTGs., had RTGs been on t h a t  f l i g h t .  Only a 
f a i l u r e  o f  an SRB i n  the head-end o f  the booster could produce fragments 
d i r e c t e d  toward the  RTGs. 
An e a r l y  ascent f a i l u r e  (over land) might cause an on-end impact o f  an 
i n t a c t  RTG s u f f i c i e n t  t o  re lease some RTG f u e l .  Such a re lease would be 
small and l i k e l y  would be l o c a l i z e d  t o  near the impact spot due t o  the  
absence o f  an explosion f i r e b a l l  a t  t he  p o i n t  o f  release. 
I n t a c t  high-speed impact o f  a T i t a n  I V / I U S  i s  l ess  l i k e l y  than f o r  the 
STS/IUS, s ince t h e  v e h i c l e  has an automatic inadver tent  separat ion des t ruc t  
mechanism. 
Consideration o f  on-orb i t ,  t r a j e c t o r y  i n s e r t i o n  and VEEGA accidents f o r  
t h e  T i t a n  IV / IUS con f igu ra t i on  are s i m i l a r  t o  those f o r  t he  STS/IUS. 
M i t i a a t i n a  Measures 
a v a i l a b l e  under t h e  delay a l t e r n a t i v e  are t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  sh ie lds  o r  b a r r i e r s  
f o r  t he  RTGs and emergency planning. The r a d i o l o g i c a l  contingency planning 
measures would be s i m i l a r  f o r  a l l  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and were discussed i n  
Sect ion 4.5.2.2.  
The p r i n c i p a l  m i t i g a t i n g  measures f o r  the launch con f igu ra t i ons  
For an expendable launch veh ic le  such as the T i t a n  IV / IUS,  t he  most 
reasonable add i t i ona l  RTG p r o t e c t i o n  design probably would be a fragment 
b a r r i e r .  The design concept would be an energy-absorbing s t r u c t u r e  mounted 
between the  RTGs and the  IUS. Because the fragment b a r r i e r  design would no t  
f u l l y  enclose the  RTGs, p r o t e c t i o n  from a near-pad ground impact would be 
l i m i t e d .  Mission performance considerat ions would r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  fragment 
b a r r i e r  be j e t t i s o n e d  p r i o r  t o  the Earth-Orbit-Escape Phase, thereby 
p rov id ing  no add i t i ona l  p r o t e c t i o n  from an E a r t h - o r b i t  explosion fo l lowed by 
reen t ry .  
4.5.2.5 Imp l i ca t i ons  o f  Unavailable In format ion 
The purpose o f  t h i s  E I S  i s  t o  present s u f f i c i e n t  in format ion t o  enable 
a choice among the a l t e r n a t i v e s  presented i n  Sect ion 2 ( i .e. ,  cont inue 
spacecraf t  modi f icat ions,  delay Gal i l e o  modi f icat ions,  cancel e i t h e r  
mission, o r  cancel both missions). The proposed act ion,  t o  cont inue Ga l i l eo  
spacecraf t  modif icat ions,  has no d i r e c t  adverse environmental impacts. 
Therefore, enough in format ion i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  enable t h a t  dec is ion t o  be 
made. 
I n  t h i s  EIS,  the launch imp l i ca t i ons  are t rea ted  i n  a p re l im ina ry  
fashion, recogniz ing t h a t  add i t i ona l  NEPA r e l a t e d  documentation w i l l  be 
prepared f o r  Ulysses and as p a r t  o f  the G a l i l e o  Mission T i e r  2 EIS.  
The d e t a i l e d  safety  and environmental analyses and sa fe ty  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
Therefore, t e s t  program f o r  t he  STS/IUS are underway but  not yet  complete. 
de ta i l ed ,  q u a n t i t a t i v e  in format ion on environmental consequences and prob- 
a b i l i t i e s  are n o t  y e t  avai lab le.  
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I n  the absence o f  the Centaur upper stage, t he  environments o f  primary 
i n t e r e s t  are due t o  motor case fragments and VEEGA reentry .  For instance, 
t he  case o f  i n t a c t  h i g h - v e l o c i t y  ground impact o f  the Shu t t l e  launch system 
was deemed n o t  c r e d i b l e  i n  the e a r l i e r  analys is  because o f  range des t ruc t  
c a p a b i l i t y  and the  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  veh ic le  break-up. 
i n t a c t  impact could l ead  t o  a severe explosion i f  the v e h i c l e  were no t  
subject  t o  p r i o r  range sa fe ty  des t ruc t  act ion.  
The concern i s  t h a t  
As s ta ted  e a r l i e r ,  an environment o f  pr imary i n t e r e s t  i s  t h a t  o f  h igh- 
The SRB motor casing v e l o c i t y  fragments due t o  s o l i d  rocket  motor rupture.  
i s  approximately one-hal f  i nch  t h i c k  (12.5 mm) and i s  a t o o l  s tee l  a l l o y .  
Although t h e  impact on s tee l  w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  from aluminum used i n  t h e  
e a r l i e r  t es ts ,  one would a lso expect, based upon recent p re l im ina ry  
analyses, t h a t  fragment ( f l y e r  p l a t e )  v e l o c i t i e s  a lso w i l l  be lower than 
those used i n  the  e a r l i e r  t es ts .  Pre l iminary r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  sa fe ty  
v e r i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  program show t h a t  t he  RTG w i l l  wi thstand SRB side-on 
fragment impact a t  212 m/s (690 f / s )  w i t h  no re lease o f  nuclear mater ia ls .  
S o l i d  rocke t  motor fragments w i l l  be t r e a t e d  i n  depth i n  the  STS/IUS safety  
analys is  and i n  t h e  G a l i l e o  Mission E I S  ( T i e r  2) .  
Another scenario under p a r t i c u l a r  discussion i s  the s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  RTG, du r ing  abor t  crash landing (e.g., a "wheels up" landing o r  "ocean 
d i t c h "  landing).  
landing but  has r e l a t i v e l y  low 1 i f t - d r a g  r a t i o  compared t o  conventional 
a i r c r a f t .  
su rv i ve  many a i r c r a f t  crashes, and consider ing the  demonstrated a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  GPHS/RTG t o  surv ive impacts a t  54 m/s (175 f / s ) ,  i t  i s  be l ieved t h a t  the 
RTG would su rv i ve  a crash landing or ocean d i t ch ,  bu t  t h i s  scenar io a lso i s  
r e c e i v i n g  f u r t h e r  study. 
The S h u t t l e  i s  designed t o  coast unpowered t o  i t s  r o u t i n e  
Based upon comparisons w i t h  a i r c r a f t  f l  ight  recorders t h a t  
Although f i n a l  numerical accident p r o b a b i l i t i e s  are n o t  y e t  a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t he  G a l i l e o  mission, discussion since the Challenger accident has 
focused on p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t o  be assigned t o  t he  launch v e h i c l e  systems. 
Based upon p r i o r  launch veh ic le  experience, the h ighest  empir ica l  accident 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  are associated w i t h  the SkBs. 
a l t e r n a t i v e  T i t a n  I V  expendable launch veh ic le  systems use SRBs du r ing  the 
e a r l i e s t  ascent phases, one could conclude t h a t  the o v e r a l l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
would be o f  t he  same order  o f  magnitude. 
Since both the  STS and the  
It does no t  appear t h a t  in format ion unavai lab le a t  t h i s  t ime i s  o f  
s u f f i c i e n t  nature t o  preclude o r  obv iate a dec is ion among the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
presented i n  Section 2. 
4.6 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
The environmental consequences t h a t  could r e s u l t  f r o m  the  implementa- 
t i o n  o f  each o f  the programmatic a l t e r n a t i v e s  ava i l ab le  t o  NASA are expected 
t o  be s i m i l a r .  The s p e c i f i c  act  o f  implementing any o f  t he  choices has no 
near-term environmental impact. However, there are s i g n i f i c a n t  program- 
matic, economic, s c i e n t i f i c ,  and g e o p o l i t i c a l  consequences associated w i t h  
the a1 te rna t i ves .  
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a 
I f  the  mod i f i ca t i ons  o f  t he  spacecraf t  were delayed a year o r  more 
u n t i l  completion o f  t h e  FSARs and t h e  add i t i ona l  NEPA r e l a t e d  documentation, 
t he re  would be major programmatic impacts. Attempting t o  r e t a i n  c r i t i c a l l y  
s k i l l e d  personnel on a standby basis would be i n o r d i n a t e l y  expensive. 
the o the r  hand, re leas ing  such personnel and l a t e r  at tempt ing t o  h i r e  
replacements undoubtedly would lead t o  delays t h a t  would threaten the  1991 
launch oppor tun i ty .  
t he  experience base o f  the cu r ren t  s t a f f .  
On 
Although NASA could regain the  s k i l l s ,  NASA would l ose  
Furthermore, add i t i ona l  delay could add r i s k  t o  the  success o f  t he  
mission. 
s e r v i  ced p e r i o d i c a l  1 y . Such serv ice woul d add expense. To minimize system de te r io ra t i on ,  t he  spacecraf t  would have t o  be 
F i n a l l y ,  f u r t h e r  delay would r e f l e c t  adversely on the  U.S. program 
v i s - a - v i s  the  space programs o f  eastern b loc nat ions.  The Soviets, f o r  
instance, have launched a mission t o  the  Mart ian moon Phobus during 1988. 
This  i s  i n  sharp con t ras t  t o  the  NASA program, which has announced a 
se r ies  o f  delays and de fe r ra l s .  
The on ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o t e n t i a l  environmental consequences are 
associated wi th  launch. Therefore, t h i s  E I S  has t r e a t e d  the launch 
i m p l i c a t i o n s  i n  a t  l e a s t  a p re l im ina ry  way, recogniz ing t h a t  t he re  w i l l  be a 
subsequent dec is ion made i n  the summer o f  1989 f o r  G a l i l e o  and i n  1990 f o r  
Ulysses. NASA w i l l  prepare add i t i ona l  NEPA r e l a t e d  documentation based on 
in format ion c u r r e n t l y  being developed f o r  the FSAR. 
impacts o f  normal launches are associated w i t h  the  STS o r  T i t a n  I V  vehic les 
and would be s i m i l a r  t o  o the r  NASA launches o f  non-RTG missions. The 
environmental consequences o f  accidents w i l l  be the  subject  o f  t he  
add i t i ona l  NEPA r e l a t e d  documentation c u r r e n t l y  under preparat ion.  
The environmental 
4.7 ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED 
There are no unavoidable adverse environmental impacts associated w i t h  
the  proposed a c t i o n  o r  the a l te rna t i ves .  
4.8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USES OF MAN’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY 
There are no impacts on the maintenance and enhancement o f  t he  long- 
t e r m  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  man’s environment as a r e s u l t  o f  t he  proposed act ion.  
The a c t i v i t i e s  associated w i t h  the proposed ac t i on  are a l l  occurr ing i n  
an e x i s t i n g  b u i l d i n g  a t  the J e t  Propulsion Laboratory. 
4.9 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENTS OF RESOURCES 
The mod i f i ca t i ons  requi red fo r  the proposed a c t i o n  i nvo l ve  the 
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  thermal blankets t o  a p o r t i o n  o f  the spacecraf t  and the  
mod i f i ca t i on  o f  hardware f o r  the mating o f  the spacecraft t o  the upper 
stage. These resources represent i n s i g n i f i c a n t  commitments o f  r e a d i l y  
avai 1 ab1 e resources. 
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5 .  LIST OF PREPARERS 
5 .1  NASA HEADQUARTERS 
Washington, DC 
5 . 2  JET PROPULSION LABORATORY 
Pasadena, CA 
5.3 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
Washington, DC and McLean, VA 
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6. AGENCIES AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED 
This Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (-EIS) was made 
available for review for a period of 45 days by Federal, state, and local 
agencies and the public, as applicable. All information received was 
considered during preparation of the Final EIS. Comments were solicited 
from the following: 
Federal Agencies : 
Counci 1 on Environmental Qual i ty 
U.S. Department of the Air Force 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
U.S. Department of Defense 
U.S. Department of Energy 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
U.S. Department o f  Transportation 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
National Academy of Sciences 
Nucl ear Regul atory Commi ssi on 
Office of Management and Budget 
State Agencies: 
F1 orida Department of Environmental Regul ati on 
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council 
Intergovernmental Coordination--Office of the Governor of 
California 
State of New Mexico 
Local Agenci es : 
Brevard County: Board of Commissioners 
Canaveral Port Authority 
Cape Canaveral, City o f  
Cocoa, City of 
Titusville, City of 
Economic Development Council 
Planning and Zoning Department 
Organi tati ons: 
Air Pollution Control Association 
Center for Law and Social Policy 
Common Cause 
Concern, Inc. 
Environmental Pol icy Institute 
Federation of American Scientists 
Florida Defenders of the Environment 
Natural Resources Defense Counci 1 
Physicians for Social Responsibility 
SANE 
Sierra Club 
Sierra Club, Florida Chapter 
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APPENDIX D 
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS 
D.l INTRODUCTION 
The purpose o f  t h i s  sect ion i s  t o  address comments received i n  response 
t o  the  d r a f t  environmental impact statement ( D E I S ) .  The D E I S  was made 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p u b l i c  review in.November 1987, and the comment pe r iod  was 
open f o r  a pe r iod  o f  45 days. 
L e t t e r s  t h a t  t ransmi t ted  w r i t t e n  comments t o  NASA on the D E I S  were 
received from several Federal, state,  and l o c a l  organizat ions.  Complete 
copies o f  these comments are presented i n  the  f o l l o w i n g  pages, and the 
comments are marked and numbered f o r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  purposes. 
Where appropriate, when a change i n  the D E I S  t e x t  was n o t  required, a 
i n  the t e x t  were appropriate, such changes have 
NASA resDonse i s  Drovided i n  t h i s  sect ion next t o  the  t e x t  t o  which i t  
appl i es . Where changes 
been noted. 
0.2 RESPONSES TO COMMEN 
The f o l l o w i n g  pages 
received from the  f o l l o w  
0 U.S. A i r  Force 
S 
provide s p e c i f i c  responses t o  comments on the D E I S  
ng organizat ions:  
0 Committee t o  Bridge the  Gap 
0 U.S. Environmental P ro tec t i on  Agency 
0 C h r i s t i c  I n s t i t u t e  
0 State o f  F lo r i da ,  O f f i c e  o f  the Governor. 
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